证券交易委员会意见书和银行贷款

Lauren M. Cunningham, Roy Schmardebeck, Wei Wang
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引用次数: 5

摘要

2002年的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)要求证券交易委员会(SEC)定期审查注册者的文件。本研究考察了SEC审查过程是否揭示了对利益相关者风险评估决策有用的信息,超出了其他公开文件中提供的信息。我们之所以采用私人债务合同,是因为公开披露美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的审查函件存在延迟,而且银行可以获得有关借款人正在进行的监管审查或调查的私人信息。通过样本内分析和差异中差异分析,并在美国证券交易委员会审查时控制公司特征和其他公开信息,我们发现银行在美国证券交易委员会审查期间和之后向客户收取更高的贷款利差,并且当审查发现重大错误,受管理自由裁量权约束的问题以及与抵押品估值相关的问题时,贷款利差的增加更高。这些发现表明,贷款人发现在美国证券交易委员会审查过程中披露的信息在债务合同中是有用的,而不是在10-K和其他公开文件中提供的信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
SEC Comment Letters and Bank Lending
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to periodically review registrants’ filings. This study examines whether the SEC review process reveals information that is useful to stakeholders’ risk assessment decisions, beyond information available in other public filings. We use private debt contracting because there are delays in the public disclosure of SEC review correspondence, and because banks have access to private information about borrowers’ ongoing regulatory reviews or investigations. Using within sample and difference-in-differences analyses, and controlling for firm characteristics and other publicly available information at the time of the SEC review, we find that banks charge higher loan spreads to clients during and after an SEC review, and that the increase in loan spreads is higher when the review identifies material errors, issues subject to managerial discretion, and issues related to collateral valuation. These findings suggest that lenders find the information revealed during the SEC review process to be useful in debt contracting, beyond information available in 10-K and other public filings.
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