OBFUSCURO:基于英特尔SGX的商品混淆引擎

Adil Ahmad, Byunggill Joe, Yuan Xiao, Yinqian Zhang, I. Shin, Byoungyoung Lee
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引用次数: 52

摘要

程序混淆是一种流行的加密结构,具有广泛的用途,如IP盗窃预防。尽管程序混淆的加密解决方案带来了不切实际的高开销,但最近在系统地利用可信硬件方面的突破显示出了希望。然而,现有的解决方案基于特殊用途的可信硬件,将其用例限制在有限的几个。在本文中,我们首先研究了基于商品可信硬件Intel SGX的这种混淆是否可行,并且我们观察到商品硬件不提供某些重要的安全考虑。特别是,我们发现现有的混淆/遗忘方案如果直接应用于SGX环境是不安全的,主要是由于侧信道限制。为此,我们提出了OBFSCURO,这是第一个使用商用可信硬件Intel SGX提供程序混淆的系统。关键思想是利用基于oram的操作来执行安全的代码执行和数据访问。最初,OBFSCURO将常规程序布局转换为侧通道安全和oram兼容的布局。然后,OBFSCURO确保其ORAM控制器始终执行数据无关访问,以保护自己免受侧信道攻击。此外,OBFSCURO通过确保程序总是在预先配置的时间间隔内运行,确保程序免受基于时间的攻击。在此过程中,OBFSCURO还引入了系统优化,例如基于寄存器的ORAM存储。我们对OBFSCURO进行了全面的安全分析,并进行了经验攻击评估,表明OBFSCURO可以保护SGX程序执行免受基于访问模式和基于时间的通道的泄漏。我们还提供了详细的性能基准测试结果,以展示OBFSCURO的实用方面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
OBFUSCURO: A Commodity Obfuscation Engine on Intel SGX
Program obfuscation is a popular cryptographic construct with a wide range of uses such as IP theft prevention. Although cryptographic solutions for program obfuscation impose impractically high overheads, a recent breakthrough in systematically leveraging trusted hardware has shown promise. However, the existing solution is based on special-purpose trusted hardware, restricting its use-cases to a limited few. In this paper, we first study if such obfuscation is feasible based on commodity trusted hardware, Intel SGX, and we observe that certain important security considerations are not afforded by commodity hardware. In particular, we found that existing obfuscation/obliviousness schemes are insecure if directly applied to the SGX environment mainly due to the side-channel limitations. To this end, we present OBFSCURO, the first system providing program obfuscation using commodity trusted hardware, Intel SGX. The key idea is to leverage ORAMbased operations to perform secure code execution and data access. Initially, OBFSCURO transforms the regular program layout into a side-channel-secure and ORAM-compatible layout. Then, OBFSCURO ensures that its ORAM controller always performs data oblivious accesses in order to protect itself from the side-channel attacks. Furthermore, OBFSCURO ensures that the program is secure from timing-based attacks by ensuring that the program always runs for a pre-configured time interval. Along the way, OBFSCURO also introduces a systematic optimization such as register-based ORAM stash. We provide a thorough security analysis of OBFSCURO along with empirical attack evaluations showing that OBFSCURO can protect the SGX program execution from being leaked by access pattern-based and timing-based channels. We also provide a detailed performance benchmark results in order to show the practical aspects of OBFSCURO.
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