薪酬委员会、首席执行官薪酬、技能和人才保留

IF 3.5 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Arifur Khan, Sutharson Kanapathippillai, Steven Dellaportas
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究的目的有三个:检验薪酬委员会(RC)对首席执行官(CEO)薪酬水平的影响;拥有RC的公司是否会向拥有不同技能(一般技能或特定技能)的首席执行官支付溢价;以及薪酬溢价是否会降低CEO离职的可能性。设计/方法/方法本研究使用了5305家公司2007年至2014年在澳大利亚证券交易所上市的公司的数据集的样本。作者使用普通最小二乘以及logit回归技术来检验制定的假设。采用差异性和倾向评分匹配技术来解决内生性问题。研究结果表明,与没有RC的公司相比,有RC的公司向首席执行官支付的总薪酬更高。此外,拥有RC的公司重视并奖励拥有一般技能的ceo,并向拥有特定行业技能的ceo支付溢价。支付溢价,反过来,通过加强CEO对组织的承诺,降低了CEO的离职率。独创性/价值本研究有助于我们理解RC在ceo薪酬中所起的关键作用。研究结果表明,RCs作为一种有效的治理机制,可以处理高管薪酬问题,并留住有技能的ceo。此外,获得和发展一般管理技能的首席执行官将能够从提高的议价能力中获得更高的薪酬。调查结果将与关心高管薪酬和业绩的股东、监管机构和公司管理层息息相关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Remuneration committees, CEO compensation, skills and retention
Purpose The purpose of this study is threefold: to examine the impact of a remuneration committee (RC) on the level of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration; whether firms with a RC, pay a premium to CEOs with different skill sets (general or specific); and whether a pay premium mitigates the potential for CEO turnover. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 5,305 firm-year observations on a data set drawn from companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 2007 to 2014. The authors use ordinary least squares as well as logit regression techniques to test the formulated hypotheses. Difference in difference and propensity score matching techniques were undertaken to address the endogeneity concerns. Findings The findings show that firms with a RC pay a higher total remuneration to CEOs compared to firms without a RC. Furthermore, firms with a RC, value and reward CEOs with general skills by paying a premium not offered to CEOs with industry-specific skills. Paying a premium, in turn, mitigates CEO turnover by strengthening the CEO’s commitment to the organisation. Originality/value The study helps us to understand the critical role played by the RC in the remuneration of CEOs. The findings show that RCs act as an effective governance mechanism to deal with issues of executive remuneration and to retain skilled CEOs. Additionally, CEOs who acquire and develop general managerial skills will be able to extract higher pay from improved bargaining power. The findings will be of relevance to shareholders, regulators and company management who have an interest in executive pay and performance.
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来源期刊
Meditari Accountancy Research
Meditari Accountancy Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
14.30%
发文量
66
期刊介绍: Meditari Accountancy Research (MEDAR). MEDAR takes its name from the Latin for constantly pondering, suggesting a journey towards a better understanding of accountancy related matters through research. Innovative and interdisciplinary approaches are encouraged. The journal is a double blind refereed publication that welcomes manuscripts using diverse research methods that address a wide range of accountancy related topics, where the terms accountancy and accounting are interpreted broadly. Manuscripts should be theoretically underpinned. Topics may include, but are not limited to: Auditing, Financial reporting, Impact of accounting on organizations, Impact of accounting on capital markets, Impact of accounting on individuals, Management accounting, Public sector accounting, Regulation of the profession, Risk management, Social and environmental disclosure, Impact of taxation on society, Accounting education, Accounting ethics.
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