基于扫描攻击Trivium密码电路的实现评估

Daisuke Oku, M. Yanagisawa, N. Togawa
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引用次数: 0

摘要

扫描路径测试是一种使用扫描链设计测试技术,可以控制和观察大规模集成电路芯片的内部寄存器。然而,攻击者也可以利用它从密码电路中检索机密信息。最近有报道称,利用大规模集成电路芯片内部的扫描链,通过对扫描数据进行密码学处理,可以恢复秘密信息的扫描攻击。本文提出了一种针对同步流密码Trivium的基于扫描的攻击方法,并利用FPGA平台SASEBO-GII对其进行了评估。在FPGA芯片上实现了Trivium密码,并对其进行了基于扫描的攻击。我们证明了基于扫描的攻击可以在几分钟内成功地恢复FPGA芯片中的秘密信息,即使FPGA芯片包含Trivium密码电路以外的几个电路,这表明基于扫描的攻击对Trivium密码不仅是模拟威胁,而且是现实威胁。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Implementation evaluation of scan-based attack against a Trivium cipher circuit
Scan-path test, which is one of design-for-test techniques using a scan chain, can control and observe internal registers in an LSI chip. However, attackers can also use it to retrieve secret information from cipher circuits. Recently, scan-based attacks using a scan chain inside an LSI chip is reported which can restore secret information by analyzing the scan data during cryptographic processing. In this paper, we pick up a scan-based attack method against a Trivium cipher, one of synchronous stream ciphers, and evaluate it using the FPGA platform called SASEBO-GII. We implement the Trivium cipher on the FPGA chip and perform the scan-based attack against it. We demonstrate that the scan-based attack can successfully restore the secret information in the FPGA chip within several minutes, even if the FPGA chip contains several circuits other than the Trivium cipher circuit, which reveals that the scan-based attack against the Trivium cipher is not only a simulation threat but a real threat.
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