{"title":"基于博弈论的房地产开发商对项目监理的考核","authors":"Chengcheng Zheng, Tao Duan","doi":"10.1109/MSIE.2011.5707561","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The rent-seeking activities can severely deteriorate the quality of projects, increase the operation cost of developers and undermine regular market order. Therefore developers should inspect them to avoid supervisers' rent-seeking activities. This paper applies the game theory approach to analyze the problem. Firstly, this paper provides the expected utility functions of a project superviser and a developer, also establishes the game model and solves the equilibriums. Finally, this paper analyzes the influencing factors of a supervisor's rent-seeking activities and brings some countermeasures of inspection on supervisers according to the results of equilibrium analysis.","PeriodicalId":18774,"journal":{"name":"MSIE 2011","volume":"1 1","pages":"98-100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Inspection on project superviser by real estate developer based on game theory\",\"authors\":\"Chengcheng Zheng, Tao Duan\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/MSIE.2011.5707561\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The rent-seeking activities can severely deteriorate the quality of projects, increase the operation cost of developers and undermine regular market order. Therefore developers should inspect them to avoid supervisers' rent-seeking activities. This paper applies the game theory approach to analyze the problem. Firstly, this paper provides the expected utility functions of a project superviser and a developer, also establishes the game model and solves the equilibriums. Finally, this paper analyzes the influencing factors of a supervisor's rent-seeking activities and brings some countermeasures of inspection on supervisers according to the results of equilibrium analysis.\",\"PeriodicalId\":18774,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"MSIE 2011\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"98-100\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-02-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"MSIE 2011\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/MSIE.2011.5707561\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"MSIE 2011","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/MSIE.2011.5707561","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Inspection on project superviser by real estate developer based on game theory
The rent-seeking activities can severely deteriorate the quality of projects, increase the operation cost of developers and undermine regular market order. Therefore developers should inspect them to avoid supervisers' rent-seeking activities. This paper applies the game theory approach to analyze the problem. Firstly, this paper provides the expected utility functions of a project superviser and a developer, also establishes the game model and solves the equilibriums. Finally, this paper analyzes the influencing factors of a supervisor's rent-seeking activities and brings some countermeasures of inspection on supervisers according to the results of equilibrium analysis.
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