推迟领取养老金年龄还是调整养老金待遇?对中国劳动力供给和个人福利的启示

Yuanyuan Deng, Hanming Fang, Katja Hanewald, Shang Wu
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们开发并校准了劳动力供给和消费的生命周期模型,以量化中国基本养老保险计划的替代养老金改革对劳动力供给、个人福利和政府预算的影响。我们重点关注城市男性,并区分低技能和高技能个体,他们在偏好、健康和劳动收入动态以及医疗费用流程方面存在差异。我们使用校准的模型来评估三种潜在的养老金改革:(i)将养老金资格年龄从60岁提高到65岁,但保持当前的养老金福利规则不变;(ii)将领取养老金的年龄保持在60岁,但按比例降低养老金福利,使养老金计划的预算与改革(i)相同;(三)将领取养老金的年龄提高到65岁,同时提高养老金福利,使两种技能类型的个人都能获得与现状相同的个人福利水平。我们发现,相对于基线,改革(i)和(ii)都可以大幅改善养老金体系的预算,但代价是两种技能类型的个人福利损失很大。相比之下,我们发现改革(iii)可以适度改善养老金制度的预算,同时确保两种技能类型的现状。我们发现,改革(一)和(二)略有增加,但改革(三)略有减少,整体劳动力供给。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Delay the Pension Age or Adjust the Pension Benefit? Implications for Labor Supply and Individual Welfare in China
We develop and calibrate a life-cycle model of labor supply and consumption to quantify the implications of alternative pension reforms on labor supply, individual welfare, and government budget for China’s basic old-age insurance program. We focus on urban males and distinguish low-skilled and high-skilled individuals, who differ in their preferences, health and labor income dynamics, and medical expense processes. We use the calibrated model to evaluate three potential pension reforms: (i) increasing the pension eligibility age from 60 to 65, but keeping the current pension benefit rule unchanged; (ii) keeping the pension eligibility age at 60, but proportionally lowering pension benefits so that the pension program’s budget is the same as under Reform (i); and (iii) increasing the pension eligibility age to 65 and simultaneously increasing the pension benefits so that individuals of both skill types attain the same individual welfare levels as in the status quo. We find that relative to the baseline, both Reforms (i) and (ii) can substantially improve the budgets of the pension system, but at the cost of substantial individual welfare loss for both skill types. In contrast, we find that Reform (iii) can modestly improve the budget of the pension system while ensuring that both skill types are as well off as in the status quo. We find that Reforms (i) and (ii) slightly increases, but Reform (iii) slightly decreases, the overall labor supply.
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