{"title":"为什么朝鲜没有发生人民力量叛乱?","authors":"A. D. Jackson","doi":"10.33526/ejks.2018181.1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One scenario put forward by researchers, political commentators and journalists for the collapse of North Korea has been a People’s Power (or popular) rebellion. This paper analyses why no popular rebellion has occurred in the DPRK under Kim Jong Un. It challenges the assumption that popular rebellion would happen because of widespread anger caused by a greater awareness of superior economic conditions outside the DPRK. Using Jack Goldstone’s theoretical expla-nations for the outbreak of popular rebellion, and comparisons with the 1989 Romanian and 2010–11 Tunisian transitions, this paper argues that marketi-zation has led to a loosening of state ideological control and to an influx of infor-mation about conditions in the outside world. However, unlike the Tunisian transitions—in which a new information context shaped by social media, the Al-Jazeera network and an experience of protest helped create a sense of pan-Arab solidarity amongst Tunisians resisting their government—there has been no similar ideology unifying North Koreans against their regime. There is evidence of discontent in market unrest in the DPRK, although protests between 2011 and the present have mostly been in defense of the right of people to support themselves through private trade. North Koreans believe this right has been guaranteed, or at least tacitly condoned, by the Kim Jong Un government. There has not been any large-scale explosion of popular anger because the state has not attempted to crush market activities outright under Kim Jong Un. There are other reasons why no popular rebellion has occurred in the North. Unlike Tunisia, the DPRK lacks a dissident political elite capable of leading an opposition movement, and unlike Romania, the DPRK authorities have shown some flexibility in their anti-dissent strategies, taking a more tolerant approach to protests against economic issues. Reduced levels of violence during periods of unrest and an effective system of information control may have helped restrict the expansion of unrest beyond rural areas.","PeriodicalId":40316,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Korean Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why Has There Been No People’s Power Rebellion in North Korea?\",\"authors\":\"A. D. 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However, unlike the Tunisian transitions—in which a new information context shaped by social media, the Al-Jazeera network and an experience of protest helped create a sense of pan-Arab solidarity amongst Tunisians resisting their government—there has been no similar ideology unifying North Koreans against their regime. There is evidence of discontent in market unrest in the DPRK, although protests between 2011 and the present have mostly been in defense of the right of people to support themselves through private trade. North Koreans believe this right has been guaranteed, or at least tacitly condoned, by the Kim Jong Un government. There has not been any large-scale explosion of popular anger because the state has not attempted to crush market activities outright under Kim Jong Un. There are other reasons why no popular rebellion has occurred in the North. 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引用次数: 1
摘要
研究人员、政治评论员和记者提出的朝鲜崩溃的一种情况是人民力量(或民众)叛乱。本文分析了金正恩领导下的朝鲜没有发生群众叛乱的原因。它挑战了一种假设,即由于人们更加了解朝鲜以外的优越经济条件而引起的广泛愤怒,将会发生民众叛乱。本文运用杰克·戈德斯通(Jack Goldstone)对民众起义爆发的理论解释,并与1989年罗马尼亚和2010-11年突尼斯的转型进行比较,认为市场化导致了国家意识形态控制的放松,以及有关外部世界状况的信息的涌入。然而,与突尼斯的过渡不同——在突尼斯的过渡中,社会媒体、半岛电视台网络和抗议经历塑造了新的信息环境,帮助突尼斯人在反抗政府的过程中形成了一种泛阿拉伯团结的感觉——朝鲜没有类似的意识形态来团结他们的政权。有证据表明,朝鲜市场动荡中存在不满情绪,尽管2011年至今的抗议活动大多是为了捍卫人民通过私人贸易维持生计的权利。朝鲜人相信这一权利得到了金正恩(Kim Jong Un)政府的保障,或者至少是默许。民众的愤怒没有大规模爆发,因为在金正恩(Kim Jong Un)的领导下,朝鲜政府没有试图彻底摧毁市场活动。北方没有发生大规模叛乱还有其他原因。与突尼斯不同,朝鲜缺乏能够领导反对派运动的持不同政见者政治精英,与罗马尼亚不同,朝鲜当局在反异见者战略上表现出一定的灵活性,对针对经济问题的抗议采取了更宽容的态度。动荡时期暴力程度的降低和有效的信息控制系统可能有助于限制动荡向农村地区以外的地区扩展。
Why Has There Been No People’s Power Rebellion in North Korea?
One scenario put forward by researchers, political commentators and journalists for the collapse of North Korea has been a People’s Power (or popular) rebellion. This paper analyses why no popular rebellion has occurred in the DPRK under Kim Jong Un. It challenges the assumption that popular rebellion would happen because of widespread anger caused by a greater awareness of superior economic conditions outside the DPRK. Using Jack Goldstone’s theoretical expla-nations for the outbreak of popular rebellion, and comparisons with the 1989 Romanian and 2010–11 Tunisian transitions, this paper argues that marketi-zation has led to a loosening of state ideological control and to an influx of infor-mation about conditions in the outside world. However, unlike the Tunisian transitions—in which a new information context shaped by social media, the Al-Jazeera network and an experience of protest helped create a sense of pan-Arab solidarity amongst Tunisians resisting their government—there has been no similar ideology unifying North Koreans against their regime. There is evidence of discontent in market unrest in the DPRK, although protests between 2011 and the present have mostly been in defense of the right of people to support themselves through private trade. North Koreans believe this right has been guaranteed, or at least tacitly condoned, by the Kim Jong Un government. There has not been any large-scale explosion of popular anger because the state has not attempted to crush market activities outright under Kim Jong Un. There are other reasons why no popular rebellion has occurred in the North. Unlike Tunisia, the DPRK lacks a dissident political elite capable of leading an opposition movement, and unlike Romania, the DPRK authorities have shown some flexibility in their anti-dissent strategies, taking a more tolerant approach to protests against economic issues. Reduced levels of violence during periods of unrest and an effective system of information control may have helped restrict the expansion of unrest beyond rural areas.