{"title":"污染还是不污染?探讨亚得里亚海防污公约的效率","authors":"Ana Grdović Gnip, Žiga Velkavrh","doi":"10.7225/toms.v11.n01.w13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the efficiency level of the current international regulatory framework (MARPOL) in preventing sea pollution during maritime transportation. We employ a game-theoretic approach that models the decisions of shipowners and countries, with respect to the treatment and disposal of waste, where shipowners' decisions are based on comprehensive estimations of all waste management costs for all categories of waste (i.e. all MARPOL Annexes) differentiated across six types of standard risk vessels, while countries' decisions are based on estimates of all societal costs of (im)proper ship waste management. We focus on the Adriatic Sea case study and evaluate the game separately for members and non-members of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU). 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引用次数: 0
摘要
本研究探讨了当前国际海事法规框架(MARPOL)在防止海上运输过程中的海洋污染方面的效率水平。我们采用博弈论方法,对船东和国家在废物处理和处置方面的决策进行建模,其中船东的决策是基于对六种标准风险船舶中所有类别废物(即所有MARPOL附件)的所有废物管理成本的综合估计,而国家的决策是基于对(不)适当的船舶废物管理的所有社会成本的估计。我们专注于亚得里亚海的案例研究,并分别为巴黎谅解备忘录(Paris Memorandum of Understanding)的成员国和非成员国评估这款游戏。我们的主要结果似乎表明,如果在巴黎谅解备忘录水域航行,船东通常会有环保的动机。否则,由于低检查率和预期的罚款,船东只会有污染的动机。本研究探讨了当前国际海事法规框架(MARPOL)在防止海上运输过程中的海洋污染方面的效率水平。我们采用博弈论方法,对船东和国家在废物处理和处置方面的决策进行建模,其中船东的决策是基于对六种标准风险船舶中所有类别废物(即所有MARPOL附件)的所有废物管理成本的综合估计,而国家的决策是基于对(不)适当的船舶废物管理的所有社会成本的估计。我们专注于亚得里亚海的案例研究,并分别为巴黎谅解备忘录(Paris Memorandum of Understanding)的成员国和非成员国评估这款游戏。我们的主要结果似乎表明,如果在巴黎谅解备忘录水域航行,船东通常会有环保的动机。否则,由于低检查率和预期的罚款,船东只会有污染的动机。
To Pollute or Not To Pollute? Exploring MARPOL Efficiency in the Adriatic Sea
This study explores the efficiency level of the current international regulatory framework (MARPOL) in preventing sea pollution during maritime transportation. We employ a game-theoretic approach that models the decisions of shipowners and countries, with respect to the treatment and disposal of waste, where shipowners' decisions are based on comprehensive estimations of all waste management costs for all categories of waste (i.e. all MARPOL Annexes) differentiated across six types of standard risk vessels, while countries' decisions are based on estimates of all societal costs of (im)proper ship waste management. We focus on the Adriatic Sea case study and evaluate the game separately for members and non-members of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU). Our main results seem to indicate that shipowners are generally motivated to be environmentally friendly if sailing Paris MoU waters. Otherwise, shipowners are merely motivated to pollute, due to low inspection rates and expected fines.This study explores the efficiency level of the current international regulatory framework (MARPOL) in preventing sea pollution during maritime transportation. We employ a game-theoretic approach that models the decisions of shipowners and countries, with respect to the treatment and disposal of waste, where shipowners' decisions are based on comprehensive estimations of all waste management costs for all categories of waste (i.e. all MARPOL Annexes) differentiated across six types of standard risk vessels, while countries' decisions are based on estimates of all societal costs of (im)proper ship waste management. We focus on the Adriatic Sea case study and evaluate the game separately for members and non-members of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU). Our main results seem to indicate that shipowners are generally motivated to be environmentally friendly if sailing Paris MoU waters. Otherwise, shipowners are merely motivated to pollute, due to low inspection rates and expected fines.
期刊介绍:
ToMS is a scientific journal with international peer review which publishes papers in the following areas: ~ Marine Engineering, ~ Navigation, ~ Safety Systems, ~ Marine Ecology, ~ Marine Fisheries, ~ Hydrography, ~ Marine Automation and Electronics, ~ Transportation and Modes of Transport, ~ Marine Information Systems, ~ Maritime Law, ~ Management of Marine Systems, ~ Marine Finance, ~ Bleeding-Edge Technologies, ~ Multimodal Transport, ~ Psycho-social and Legal Aspects of Long-term Working Aboard. The journal is published in English as an open access journal, and as a classic paper journal (in limited editions). ToMS aims to present best maritime research from South East Europe, particularly the Mediterranean area. Articles will be double-blind reviewed by three reviewers. With the intention of providing an international perspective at least one of the reviewers will be from abroad. ToMS also promotes scientific collaboration with students and has a section titled Students’ ToMS. These papers also undergo strict peer reviews. Furthermore, the Journal publishes short reviews on significant papers, books and workshops in the fields of maritime science.