洞察审计公共监督委员会:它们是否“工作”、如何“工作”以及为什么“工作”

Michelle Hanlon, Nemit Shroff
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引用次数: 19

摘要

我们调查了来自20个国家的审计公共监督委员会(POB)的170名检查员,占检查人员的27%,以了解审计人员是否、如何以及为什么要改变审计实践以应对POB的监督。我们询问了文献中的几个理论和领域。我们发现绝大多数POB检查员认为审核员经常通过改变审计程序和质量控制系统来回应审核员的反馈。检查员认为检查对审计的几个方面有广泛的影响,从文件、管理估计的审查、培训到审计质量审查过程的变化、公司文化,有时甚至是补偿政策。检查员认为审计师对他们的反馈做出回应的主要原因是:1)POB的执行能力,2)POB的权威性,3)检查结果的公开披露,以及4)POB具有有利于发现审计缺陷的文化。横断面测试表明,检查频率和POB雇用的检查员人数也影响审核员对检查反馈的反应程度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Insights into Auditor Public Oversight Boards: Whether, How, and Why they 'Work'
We survey 170 inspectors, representing 27% of the inspection staff, from auditor public oversight boards (POBs) in 20 countries to understand whether, how, and why auditors change auditing practices in response to POB oversight. We ask about several theories and areas in the literature. We find that a large majority of POB inspectors believe that auditors frequently respond to inspector feedback by changing audit procedures and quality control systems. Inspectors perceive inspections to have broad effects on several aspects of auditing, ranging from documentation, scrutiny of management estimates, and training to changes in the audit-quality review process, firm culture and on occasion even compensation policies. Inspectors perceive that the primary reasons why auditors respond to their feedback are 1) POB enforcement capabilities, 2) the perceived authority of the POBs, 3) public disclosure of inspection findings, and 4) that POBs have a culture conducive for detecting auditing deficiencies. Cross-sectional tests suggest that inspection frequency and the number of inspectors employed by a POB also affect the perceived extent to which auditors respond to inspection feedback.
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