高管奖金、薪酬和财务杠杆:增长和高管所有权重要吗?

IF 4.3 Q2 MANAGEMENT

International Journal of Accounting and Information Management Pub Date : 2021-05-19 DOI:10.1108/IJAIM-09-2020-0141

E. Adu‐Ameyaw, A. Danso, Samuel Acheampong, Cynthia Akwei

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引用次数: 7

摘要

本研究旨在考察高管奖金薪酬对公司财务杠杆政策的影响，以及薪酬-杠杆关系在多大程度上受到公司成长和高管所有权的调节。设计/方法/方法利用2007-2015年期间来自213家英国富时350指数成分股公司的非金融和非公用事业公司的数据，产生了总共1784家公司的年度观察结果，使用面板计量经济学方法来测试模型。结果从代理理论的角度分析，发现管理层现金奖金薪酬与财务杠杆呈显著负相关。而股票奖金补偿对杠杆率有显著的正向影响。本研究还发现，薪酬杠杆受到公司成长和高管持股的调节。结果仍然是稳健的替代计量经济模型。原创性/价值虽然本文建立在高管奖金薪酬文献的风险动机论点的基础上，但它是第一次-尽其所知-探索奖金薪酬-公司财务杠杆，特别是检查公司成长和公司高管所有权在这种关系中的影响程度。

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Executive bonus compensation and financial leverage: do growth and executive ownership matter?

Purpose This study aims to examine the impact of executive bonus compensation on a firm’s financial leverage policy and the extent to which this compensation–leverage relation is moderated by firm growth and executive ownership. Design/methodology/approach Using data from 213 non-financial and non-utility UK FTSE 350 firms for the period 2007–2015, generating a total of 1,784 firm-year observations, panel econometric methods are used to test the model. Findings Drawing insights from agency theoretic view, this paper uncovers that managerial cash bonus compensation is negatively and significantly related to financial leverage. However, stock bonus compensation has a positive and significant impact on leverage. This study also observes that compensation–leverage is moderated by both firm growth and executive ownership. The results remain robust to alternative econometric models. Originality/value While this paper builds on the risk-motivated argument of executive bonus compensation literature, it is the first – to the best of the knowledge – to explore the bonus compensation-corporate financial leverage and, particularly, examine the extent to which firm growth and corporate executive ownership matter in this relationship.

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来源期刊

International Journal of Accounting and Information Management MANAGEMENT-

CiteScore

7.90

自引率

3.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The International Journal of Accounting & Information Management focuses on publishing research in accounting, finance, and information management. It specifically emphasizes the interaction between these research areas on an international scale and within both the private and public sectors. The aim of the journal is to bridge the knowledge gap between researchers and practitioners by covering various issues that arise in the field. These include information systems, accounting information management, innovation and technology in accounting, accounting standards and reporting, and capital market efficiency.