房地产融资的治理是什么?以19世纪法国的credit Foncier为例

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
D. L. Bris
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引用次数: 1

摘要

Foncier受益于不同寻常的治理,这是一个鼓舞人心的来源,因为它已经充分履行了其房地产融资使命。私人股东与国家任命的经理人之间强烈的代理冲突,可以通过高度参与的董事会和购买大量持股以保证良好管理的需要来解决。债券持有人与管理者和股东之间关于银行所承担的风险水平的冲突,通过以下措施得以解决:法律禁止在没有优质贷款作为抵押品的情况下发行债券,每月公布其资产负债表,并强制实施5%的“巴塞尔比率”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Quelle gouvernance pour le financement immobilier ? Le cas du Crédit Foncier de France au XIX e siècle
The Foncier benefits from unusual governance, which is a source of inspiration since it has amply fulfilled its real-estate financing mission. The strong agency conflict between private shareholders and state-appointed managers is resolved by a highly involved board and the need to buy a substantial number of shares held as guarantee for good management. Conflicts between bond holders and both managers and shareholders about the risk level taken by the bank are resolved by the legal prohibition on issuing bonds without quality loans as collateral, monthly publication of its balance sheet and imposition of a “Basel ratio” of 5 %.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
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