{"title":"期望对游戏的战略影响","authors":"L. Godo, Enrico Marchioni","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.146.2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria.","PeriodicalId":53035,"journal":{"name":"Hkhmt m`Sr","volume":"65 1","pages":"9-15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations\",\"authors\":\"L. Godo, Enrico Marchioni\",\"doi\":\"10.4204/EPTCS.146.2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria.\",\"PeriodicalId\":53035,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Hkhmt m`Sr\",\"volume\":\"65 1\",\"pages\":\"9-15\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-04-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Hkhmt m`Sr\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.2\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hkhmt m`Sr","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.146.2","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria.
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