R. V.库纳。我会成为半机械人吗?/反式。来自英格兰。r.l.科赫涅夫

R. L. Kochnev
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引用次数: 0

摘要

埃里克·奥尔森的动物主义观点建立在一个前提上,用威金斯的术语来说,人不适合作为物质概念的候选者。相反,他声称,动物最适合回答我们最根本的是什么,以及是什么决定了我们的持续条件。提出一个关于无机替代的思想实验,我的目的是表明奥尔森的动物主义观点不能适应我们对这种情况的强烈直觉。我的观点是,动物主义要么在自身的基础上失败,要么需要对有机体的本质及其持续条件进行一些调整。我将研究Matthew Liao在动物主义观点中容纳这种直觉的尝试。我还将描述奥尔森动物主义观点的基础,但让我们先看看我的思想实验的大致轮廓。要点如下,其余的我将在后面提供。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
R. V. Cuhna. Will I ever be a Cyborg? / trans. from Engl. R. L. Kochnev
Eric Olson’s animalist view relies on the premise that person is not a fit candidate to be a substance concept, in Wiggins’s terminology. Instead, he claims, animal is what best serves as the answer to what we most fundamentally are and what determines our persistence conditions. Pro-posing a thought experiment concerning inorganic replacement, I aim to show that Olson’s animalist view cannot accommodate our very strong intuitions about such cases. My claim is then that animalism either fails on its own grounds or requires some tuning regarding what exactly an organism is and its persistence conditions. I will examine Matthew Liao’s attempt to accommodate such intuitions within an animalist view. I will also describe the basics about Olson’s animalist view but let us first look at the rough outline of my thought experiment. The essentials are as follows, the rest I will provide later, as we go along.
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