A. Schmeink
{"title":"限制干扰系统中的公平速率自适应","authors":"A. Schmeink","doi":"10.1002/ett.1469","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A fair allocation of scarce resources is crucial in systems where multiple entities compete for the same goods. General interference-limited communication systems with rate adaption are investigated in this paper and the problem of fair resource allocation is addressed by two different approaches. First, a non game theoretic fairness approach is applied to the system model. Then bargaining theory is exploited to derive a game theoretic fairness concept. To compensate the information transmission necessary in the bargaining game, so-called incentive parameters are introduced. The solution of the thereby obtained local problem coincides with the Nash bargaining solution of the global problem if the incentive parameters are properly chosen. Numerical results show the advantage of the game theoretical modelling with respect to fairness and efficiency. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.","PeriodicalId":50473,"journal":{"name":"European Transactions on Telecommunications","volume":"94 1","pages":"200-210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On fair rate adaption in interference-limited systems\",\"authors\":\"A. Schmeink\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/ett.1469\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A fair allocation of scarce resources is crucial in systems where multiple entities compete for the same goods. General interference-limited communication systems with rate adaption are investigated in this paper and the problem of fair resource allocation is addressed by two different approaches. First, a non game theoretic fairness approach is applied to the system model. Then bargaining theory is exploited to derive a game theoretic fairness concept. To compensate the information transmission necessary in the bargaining game, so-called incentive parameters are introduced. The solution of the thereby obtained local problem coincides with the Nash bargaining solution of the global problem if the incentive parameters are properly chosen. Numerical results show the advantage of the game theoretical modelling with respect to fairness and efficiency. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.\",\"PeriodicalId\":50473,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Transactions on Telecommunications\",\"volume\":\"94 1\",\"pages\":\"200-210\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"11\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Transactions on Telecommunications\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1002/ett.1469\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Transactions on Telecommunications","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/ett.1469","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11