零售商仿冒不确定性下的供应链契约

IF 0.1 4区工程技术 Q4 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING

Manufacturing Engineering Pub Date : 2014-01-13 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2378226

N. Sundaresan, Janat Shah

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们模拟了一个供应链场景，其中正品制造商不确定零售商是否在销售正品的同时销售假冒产品。我们评估了批发价格合同和两部分关税合同下参与者的最优策略，并分析了零售商假冒的不确定性对制造商定价和预期利润的影响。此外，我们研究了两部分关税是否比批发价格合同更有效。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Supply Chain Contracts Under Uncertainty of Retailer Counterfeiting

We model a supply chain scenario in which the genuine manufacturer is uncertain whether a retailer sells counterfeits alongside authentic products. We evaluate the optimal strategies for players under wholesale price contracts and two-part tariff contracts and analyse the impact of the uncertainty of retailer counterfeiting on the manufacturer’s pricing and expected profits. Furthermore, we investigate whether the two-part tariff is more effective compared with the wholesale price contract.

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来源期刊

Manufacturing Engineering 工程技术-工程：制造

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： Information not localized