联盟形成的不同原理与战略投票的激励

IF 1 4区数学

Applied Mathematics-A Journal of Chinese Universities Series B Pub Date : 2018-07-12 DOI:10.4236/am.2018.97058

Eric Linhart, Johannes Raabe

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引用次数: 0

摘要

对战略投票的研究主要集中在选举制度效应上，而忽略了不同组阁理由的影响。基于理性政党选择的正式模型和模拟研究，我们系统地研究了这种影响并探讨了其含义。我们表明，潜在联盟形成程序的逻辑清楚地影响选民在投票选择方面暴露于战略激励的程度。关键的含义是，如果政党寻求政策，如果在联盟组建阶段不确定性增加，真诚的投票往往更符合选民的最佳利益。此外，我们探讨了不同类型的联盟形成如何影响整个政策空间的战略激励。

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Different Rationales of Coalition Formation and Incentives for Strategic Voting

Research on strategic voting has mainly focused on electoral system effects but largely neglected the impact of different rationales of coalition formation. Based on a formal model of rational party choice and a simulation study, we systematically investigate this impact and explore the implications. We show that the logic of the underlying coalition formation procedure clearly affects the degree to which the electorate is exposed to strategic incentives regarding the vote choice. The key implications are that sincere voting is more often in the voter’s best interest if parties are policy-seeking and if there is increased uncertainty during the stage of coalition formation. Furthermore, we explore how different types of coalition formation affect strategic incentives across the policy space.

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来源期刊

Applied Mathematics-A Journal of Chinese Universities Series B MATHEMATICS, APPLIED-

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Applied Mathematics promotes the integration of mathematics with other scientific disciplines, expanding its fields of study and promoting the development of relevant interdisciplinary subjects. The journal mainly publishes original research papers that apply mathematical concepts, theories and methods to other subjects such as physics, chemistry, biology, information science, energy, environmental science, economics, and finance. In addition, it also reports the latest developments and trends in which mathematics interacts with other disciplines. Readers include professors and students, professionals in applied mathematics, and engineers at research institutes and in industry. Applied Mathematics - A Journal of Chinese Universities has been an English-language quarterly since 1993. The English edition, abbreviated as Series B, has different contents than this Chinese edition, Series A.