笛卡儿论美德的统一性

IF 0.5 4区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.5840/jpr202247192

Saja Parvizian

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引用次数: 1

摘要

评论家们忽略了笛卡尔德性理论中的一个矛盾。在一些文本中，笛卡尔似乎认为存在不同的美德。在其他文本中，笛卡儿似乎认为只有一种美德——坚定而持久地善用意志的决心。在本文中，我调和了这种矛盾。我认为笛卡儿支持美德统一命题的一个特定版本，即美德的同一性。尽管如此，笛卡尔还是有足够的资源来区分各种美德。当我们考虑以不同的方式使用意志的坚定和持续的决心时，即基于这种决心在道德情境中表现的不同方式，不同的美德在概念上就产生了。

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Descartes on the Unity of the Virtues

Commentators have neglected a tension in Descartes’s virtue theory. In some texts, Descartes seems to argue that there are distinct virtues. In other texts, Descartes seems to argue that there is only a single virtue—the firm and constant resolution to use the will well. In this paper, I reconcile this tension. I argue that Descartes endorses a specific version of the unity of the virtues thesis, namely, the identity of the virtues. Nonetheless, Descartes has the resources to draw conceptual distinctions between various virtues. Distinct virtues are conceptually generated when we regard the firm and constant resolution to use the will well in different ways, that is, based on the different ways this resolution manifests in moral situations.

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来源期刊

Journal of Philosophical Research PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Philosophical Research is an annual peer-reviewed journal uniquely committed to the advancement of all areas of philosophical inquiry. It publishes articles from any philosophical orientation, in English or French, that make a significant contribution to the field. A generous length limit provides an outlet for essential works such as bibliographies, translations, and commentaries that are difficult to publish because of unusual length or complex format. JPR is particularly interested in helping new authors and an outstanding group of referees provides written comments on submitted manuscripts.