{"title":"国家和族长:改写Charan Lal Sahu, Rakesh Shrouti, Rajkumar Keswani, Nasrin Bi和其他人诉印度联邦(1990)1 SCC 613","authors":"Sannoy Das, A. Mazumdar","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2021.1922032","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this contribution, as part of the Indian Feminist Judgement Project, we reconsider the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the Charan Lal Sahu case that followed the Bhopal gas leak tragedy. We present a dissenting opinion on the case, finding that the law empowering the State to supplant the victim-survivors as plaintiffs was unconstitutional. Alongside, we offer a brief commentary on why this finding comports with what a feminist judge on the bench might have decided. We consider a variety of ways in which feminist criticism of the majority decision might proceed, and how this criticism informs our rewriting. We also consider a set of persistent questions about feminist judging, and ways in which our rewriting, in turn, might be subject to further feminist objections.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The state and the patriarch: rewriting Charan Lal Sahu, Rakesh Shrouti, Rajkumar Keswani, Nasrin Bi and others v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 613\",\"authors\":\"Sannoy Das, A. Mazumdar\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/24730580.2021.1922032\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT In this contribution, as part of the Indian Feminist Judgement Project, we reconsider the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the Charan Lal Sahu case that followed the Bhopal gas leak tragedy. We present a dissenting opinion on the case, finding that the law empowering the State to supplant the victim-survivors as plaintiffs was unconstitutional. Alongside, we offer a brief commentary on why this finding comports with what a feminist judge on the bench might have decided. We consider a variety of ways in which feminist criticism of the majority decision might proceed, and how this criticism informs our rewriting. We also consider a set of persistent questions about feminist judging, and ways in which our rewriting, in turn, might be subject to further feminist objections.\",\"PeriodicalId\":13511,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Indian Law Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-05-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Indian Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1922032\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Indian Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2021.1922032","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The state and the patriarch: rewriting Charan Lal Sahu, Rakesh Shrouti, Rajkumar Keswani, Nasrin Bi and others v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 613
ABSTRACT In this contribution, as part of the Indian Feminist Judgement Project, we reconsider the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the Charan Lal Sahu case that followed the Bhopal gas leak tragedy. We present a dissenting opinion on the case, finding that the law empowering the State to supplant the victim-survivors as plaintiffs was unconstitutional. Alongside, we offer a brief commentary on why this finding comports with what a feminist judge on the bench might have decided. We consider a variety of ways in which feminist criticism of the majority decision might proceed, and how this criticism informs our rewriting. We also consider a set of persistent questions about feminist judging, and ways in which our rewriting, in turn, might be subject to further feminist objections.