始终保持警惕:通过政府问责局的政治背景和国会监督

IF 0.9
Joshua B. Kennedy
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引用次数: 0

摘要

对行政部门的监督是国会最重要的职能之一。它旨在确保联邦官僚机构在实施项目时的问责制、一致性和公平性。之前的许多学术研究都认为,当国会和白宫由不同党派控制时,监督更为普遍。然而,大部分研究主要集中在委员会听证会上,其他监督工具受到的关注较少。其中一个工具就是政府问责局(GAO)。我测试了关于政府问责局用法的不同理论:一种认为政府问责局报告只是监督的另一种工具,就像听证会一样,往往遵循类似的模式,因此在分裂的政府条件下更常见。另一种理论认为,由于政府问责局致力于提供有用的、无党派的信息,当立法和总统的优先事项一致时,它更有可能被使用。根据美国政府问责局1995年至2022年的报告,我发现后一种说法得到了支持,至少在现代国会是这样。有证据表明,国会根据政治动机改变了监督方法,但不管怎样,监督仍在继续。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Always Watchful: Political Context and Congressional Oversight through the Government Accountability Office
Abstract Oversight of the executive branch is one of Congress’s most critical functions. It is meant to ensure accountability, consistency, and fairness in the implementation of programs by the federal bureaucracy. Much previous scholarship has argued that oversight is more common when Congress and the White House are controlled by different parties. However, much of this research has focused principally on committee hearings, and other tools of oversight have received less attention. One such tool is the Government Accountability Office (GAO). I test competing theories of GAO usage: one which argues that GAO reports are simply another tool of oversight, like hearings, and tend to follow similar patterns and thus are more common in conditions of divided government. The other theory argues that the GAO, because of its commitment to providing useful, nonpartisan information, is more likely to be used when legislative and presidential priorities are aligned. Leveraging reports from the GAO between 1995 and 2022, I find support for the latter proposition, at least in the modern Congress. There is evidence that Congress changes its methods of oversight in response to political incentives, but oversight continues regardless.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
11.10%
发文量
34
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