THE INSTRUMENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL HEURISTICS

The study surveys the conceptions of philosophical heuristics of J. Baggini and P. S. Fosl, D. Dennett, A. Hájek, and R. Nozick. All conceptions surveyed in the study are instrumental. R. Nozick’s philosophical heuristics and A. Hájek’s philosophical heuristics ought to be considered “authentic” because R. Nozick and A. Hájek called them “the philosophical heuristics.” Those philosophical heuristics aim to solve (philosophical) problems and are rooted in the Decision theory. D. Dennett’s “philosophical heuristics” according to the A. H?jek’s classification is the so-called “hand tools of the mind,” consisting of intuitive pumps and other kinds of thought experiments, analogies, examples, labels, metaphors, and staging. The purpose of D. Dennett’s “philosophical heuristics” is to deliver non-precise instruments for thinking. The “philosophical heuristics” of Baggini and P. S. Fosl is a part of the so called “philosophers’ toolkit” and is represented by heuristic devices that are used to find out interesting things from which you can learn new knowledge. At the same time, the devices imply the use of some method of knowledge not for its intended purpose.