CEO继任计划对股东财富的影响

IF 1.9 Q3 BUSINESS

International Journal of the Economics of Business Pub Date : 2021-06-29 DOI:10.1080/13571516.2021.1945856

Paul Farah, Hui Li

{"title":"CEO继任计划对股东财富的影响","authors":"Paul Farah, Hui Li","doi":"10.1080/13571516.2021.1945856","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine the lack of planning in CEO successions and its effect on shareholder wealth for 162 cases of no succession planning. We attribute the lack of potential or actual permanent replacement at the time of the announcement of departure or actual departure of the CEO to the great need for an outsider selection to lead the company. Our findings suggest that the effect of relaxing the time constraint to choose a successor is mixed. An increase in shareholders wealth will reward boards that are able to select an outsider. Companies that appoint an insider after an interim period have a poorer performance than companies that appoint an insider in an orderly succession process. We find that the lack of succession planning does not affect long term performance if boards are willing to put effort towards selecting the most suitable candidates.","PeriodicalId":45470,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Economics of Business","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Effects of CEO Succession Planning on Shareholder Wealth\",\"authors\":\"Paul Farah, Hui Li\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13571516.2021.1945856\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract We examine the lack of planning in CEO successions and its effect on shareholder wealth for 162 cases of no succession planning. We attribute the lack of potential or actual permanent replacement at the time of the announcement of departure or actual departure of the CEO to the great need for an outsider selection to lead the company. Our findings suggest that the effect of relaxing the time constraint to choose a successor is mixed. An increase in shareholders wealth will reward boards that are able to select an outsider. Companies that appoint an insider after an interim period have a poorer performance than companies that appoint an insider in an orderly succession process. We find that the lack of succession planning does not affect long term performance if boards are willing to put effort towards selecting the most suitable candidates.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45470,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of the Economics of Business\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-06-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of the Economics of Business\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13571516.2021.1945856\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of the Economics of Business","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13571516.2021.1945856","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文研究了162个CEO继任缺乏规划的案例及其对股东财富的影响。我们认为，在首席执行官宣布离职或实际离职时，缺乏潜在的或实际的永久替代人选，是因为非常需要选择一位外部人士来领导公司。我们的研究结果表明，放宽选择继任者的时间限制的效果是混合的。股东财富的增加将奖励那些能够选择外部人士的董事会。在一段过渡时期之后任命内部人士的公司，其业绩不如在有序继任过程中任命内部人士的公司。我们发现，如果董事会愿意努力选择最合适的候选人，那么缺乏继任计划并不会影响长期绩效。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

The Effects of CEO Succession Planning on Shareholder Wealth

Abstract We examine the lack of planning in CEO successions and its effect on shareholder wealth for 162 cases of no succession planning. We attribute the lack of potential or actual permanent replacement at the time of the announcement of departure or actual departure of the CEO to the great need for an outsider selection to lead the company. Our findings suggest that the effect of relaxing the time constraint to choose a successor is mixed. An increase in shareholders wealth will reward boards that are able to select an outsider. Companies that appoint an insider after an interim period have a poorer performance than companies that appoint an insider in an orderly succession process. We find that the lack of succession planning does not affect long term performance if boards are willing to put effort towards selecting the most suitable candidates.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

International Journal of the Economics of Business BUSINESS-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Journal of the Economics of Business presents original, peer reviewed research in economics that is clearly applicable to business or related public policy problems or issues. The term "business" is used in its widest sense to encompass both public and private sector—governmental, private non-profit and cooperative organizations, as well as profit-seeking enterprises. International Journal of the Economics of Business carries papers relating to three main spheres: The organization—to analyse and aid decision making and the internal organization of the business; The industry—to analyse how businesses interact and evolve within and across industries.