公司法与公司理论:重组公司、董事、所有者和投资者

W. Huber
{"title":"公司法与公司理论:重组公司、董事、所有者和投资者","authors":"W. Huber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3547632","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders’ property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions. <br><br>In this book the author performs a rigorous, systematic analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that proves shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. Furthermore, the author proves the theory of the firm, which is founded on the separation of ownership and control and directors as agents of shareholders, promotes an agenda that wilfully ignores fundamental property law and agency law. However, since shareholders do not own the corporation, and directors are not agents of shareholders, the theory of the firm collapses.<br><br>The book corrects decades of confusion and misguided research in corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and will allow readers to understand how property law, agency law, and economics contradict each other when applied to corporate law. It will appeal to researchers and upper level and graduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as attorneys and, accountants.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm: Reconstructing Corporations, Directors, Owners, and Investors\",\"authors\":\"W. Huber\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3547632\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders’ property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions. <br><br>In this book the author performs a rigorous, systematic analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that proves shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. Furthermore, the author proves the theory of the firm, which is founded on the separation of ownership and control and directors as agents of shareholders, promotes an agenda that wilfully ignores fundamental property law and agency law. However, since shareholders do not own the corporation, and directors are not agents of shareholders, the theory of the firm collapses.<br><br>The book corrects decades of confusion and misguided research in corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and will allow readers to understand how property law, agency law, and economics contradict each other when applied to corporate law. It will appeal to researchers and upper level and graduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as attorneys and, accountants.\",\"PeriodicalId\":10506,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Columbia Law School\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-03-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Columbia Law School\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547632\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Columbia Law School","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547632","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

数十种司法意见认为,股东拥有公司,董事是股东的代理人,甚至董事是股东财产的受托人。然而,直到现在,它还没有得到证实。这些学说建立在未经证实的假设之上。在这本书中,作者利用证明股东不拥有公司、所有权和控制权不分离、董事不是股东的代理人、股东不是投资者的司法判决,对普通法、合同法、财产法、代理法、合伙法、信托法、公司成文法等进行了严格而系统的分析。进一步论证了建立在所有权与控制权分离和董事作为股东代理人的基础上的公司理论,提出了一种故意忽视基本物权法和代理法的议程。然而,由于股东并不拥有公司,董事也不是股东的代理人,公司理论就失效了。这本书纠正了几十年来在公司法和公司经济理论方面的混乱和错误的研究,并将让读者了解物权法、代理法和经济学在适用于公司法时是如何相互矛盾的。它将吸引经济、金融、会计、法律、社会学以及律师和会计师等领域的研究人员、高级和研究生。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm: Reconstructing Corporations, Directors, Owners, and Investors
Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders’ property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions.

In this book the author performs a rigorous, systematic analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that proves shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. Furthermore, the author proves the theory of the firm, which is founded on the separation of ownership and control and directors as agents of shareholders, promotes an agenda that wilfully ignores fundamental property law and agency law. However, since shareholders do not own the corporation, and directors are not agents of shareholders, the theory of the firm collapses.

The book corrects decades of confusion and misguided research in corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and will allow readers to understand how property law, agency law, and economics contradict each other when applied to corporate law. It will appeal to researchers and upper level and graduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as attorneys and, accountants.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信