可调FPGA位流混淆与布尔可满足性攻击对策

Brooks Olney, Robert Karam
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引用次数: 9

摘要

现场可编程门阵列(fpga)在许多新兴应用领域的使用激增,其中现场可重构性对于具有动态设计要求的各种应用(如云计算、汽车、物联网和航空航天)是一个有吸引力的特性。FPGA配置文件或位流的安全性至关重要,特别是对于具有长现场生命周期的设备,攻击者可能试图从内部提取有价值的知识产权(IP)。在本文中,我们提出了一种可调的混淆方法,该方法可以保护IP免受典型的比特流攻击,同时使设计人员能够在可接受的开销下权衡安全性。我们还考虑了对这种保护机制的两种潜在攻击:对混淆的布尔SAT攻击和对保护电路的移除攻击。混淆和SAT对策集成在商业FPGA工具流中的定制CAD框架中,并一起提供数学上强大的保护,防止常见的比特流攻击。此外,我们量化了通过模式匹配和直接比特流操作对保护电路进行移除攻击的难度。对于小型组合电路,在失配概率为95%的情况下,混淆的平均面积、功率和延迟开销分别为18%、16%和8%,对于较大的算术模块,则分别为1%、2%和5%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Tunable FPGA Bitstream Obfuscation with Boolean Satisfiability Attack Countermeasure
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are seeing a surge in usage in many emerging application domains, where the in-field reconfigurability is an attractive characteristic for diverse applications with dynamic design requirements, such as cloud computing, automotive, IoT, and aerospace. The security of the FPGA configuration file, or bitstream, is critical, especially for devices with long in-field lifetimes, where attackers may attempt to extract valuable Intellectual Property (IP) from within. In this article, we propose a tunable obfuscation approach that protects IP from typical bitstream attacks while enabling designers to trade off security with acceptable overhead. We also consider two potential attacks on this protection mechanism: Boolean SAT Attacks on the obfuscation and removal attacks on the protection circuitry. The obfuscation and SAT countermeasure are integrated in a custom CAD framework within a commercial FPGA toolflow and together provide mathematically strong protection against common bitstream attacks. Further, we quantify the difficulty of a removal attack on the protection circuitry through pattern matching and direct bitstream manipulation. The average area, power, and delay overhead for obfuscation with 95% mismatch probability are 18%, 16%, and 8%, respectively, for small combinational circuits, and 1%, 2%, and 5% for larger arithmetic modules.
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