{"title":"戴蒙德和戴布维格的经典金融中介理论:缺失了什么?","authors":"E. Green, P. Lin","doi":"10.21034/QR.2411","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The article shows that in a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig model (1983), the ex ante efficient allocation can be implemented as a unique equilibrium. This is so even in the presence of the sequential service constraint, as emphasized by Wallace (1988), whereby the bank must solve a sequence of maximization problems as depositors contact it at different times. A three-trader example with constant relative risk-aversion utility is used in order to illustrate clearly the requirements that the sequential service constraint imposes on implementation.","PeriodicalId":78784,"journal":{"name":"The Quarterly review","volume":"183 1","pages":"3-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"104","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial intermediation : what's missing?\",\"authors\":\"E. Green, P. Lin\",\"doi\":\"10.21034/QR.2411\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The article shows that in a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig model (1983), the ex ante efficient allocation can be implemented as a unique equilibrium. This is so even in the presence of the sequential service constraint, as emphasized by Wallace (1988), whereby the bank must solve a sequence of maximization problems as depositors contact it at different times. A three-trader example with constant relative risk-aversion utility is used in order to illustrate clearly the requirements that the sequential service constraint imposes on implementation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":78784,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Quarterly review\",\"volume\":\"183 1\",\"pages\":\"3-13\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2000-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"104\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Quarterly review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21034/QR.2411\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Quarterly review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21034/QR.2411","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial intermediation : what's missing?
The article shows that in a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig model (1983), the ex ante efficient allocation can be implemented as a unique equilibrium. This is so even in the presence of the sequential service constraint, as emphasized by Wallace (1988), whereby the bank must solve a sequence of maximization problems as depositors contact it at different times. A three-trader example with constant relative risk-aversion utility is used in order to illustrate clearly the requirements that the sequential service constraint imposes on implementation.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
