管理特质的劳动力市场价值是如何演变的?

Si Li, M. F. Perez
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引用次数: 1

摘要

高管个人特质的劳动力市场价值是如何随时间演变的?我们提出并估计了一个交互式固定效应模型,该模型允许对未观察到的经理属性进行时变估值。我们发现,管理人才是决定薪酬最重要的未被观察到的特质。基于每个人才十分位数的薪酬溢价具有显著的时间变化,并与股市同步波动。这种薪酬溢价集中在顶级人才管理人员中,人才水平中位数的高管总薪酬溢价为24.1万美元,而人才水平最高的高管总薪酬溢价为113.6万美元。我们还确定了第二个经济上重要的执行特征,这一特征与管理谨慎或风险厌恶有关。这一特征的薪酬溢价与股票市场风险溢价的时间变化有关,在低(高)风险溢价时期,谨慎性被贴现(补偿)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How do the Labor Market Values of Managerial Traits Evolve?
How do the labor market values of executives’ personal traits evolve over time? We propose and estimate an interactive fixed effects model, which allows for time-variant valuation of unobserved manager attributes. We find that managerial talent is the most important unobserved trait determining compensation. The pay premium based on each talent decile has significant time variation that co-moves with the stock market. Such pay premium is concentrated among top talented managers, with executives at the median level of talent earning $241,000 total pay premium and those at the top talent decile earning $1,136,000. We also identify a second economically important executive trait, and this trait is related to managerial cautiousness or risk aversion. The pay premium of this trait is linked to the time variation in the equity market risk premium, with cautiousness being discounted (compensated) during the low (high) risk premium period.
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