{"title":"政府法令的不可版权性","authors":"Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Peter S. Menell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3477564","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court appeal of Georgia, et al., v. Public.Resource.Org., explores the interplay of copyright law and the edicts of government doctrine. The “edicts of government” doctrine was first validated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of nineteenth century cases. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). While the doctrine has never been directly recognized in the express wording of the copyright statute, it is nevertheless firmly rooted in foundational copyright principles that are themselves reflected in the text of the statute. \n \nThree foundational copyright principles buttress the doctrine. First, copyrightable authorship does not extend to official announcements of law, the hallmark of edicts of government. Authorship as requires personalization, an attribute that is antithetical to official pronouncements of law, which are generated in an impersonal and ex officio manner. Second, all edicts of government, as legal texts, are methods of operation, rendering them uncopyrightable. Third, authentic statements of law entail the merger of idea and expression insofar as the expression underlying edicts of government are capable of being expressed in only a limited number of ways in order to preserve its authenticity. \n \nConsequently, the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.) is not copyrightable. Petitioners concede that the statutory content of the O.C.G.A. is uncopyrightable. The annotations incorporated into the O.C.G.A. by the state legislature bear the imprimatur of the state and are therefore produced under the ostensible authority of the state, which renders them an edict of government. Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, an edict does not need to have the force of law to qualify as an uncopyrightable edict of government. The Supreme Court’s precedents contradict this position. Instead, faithful reading of these precedents suggest that something becomes an uncopyrightable edict of government when it is produced under the ostensible authority of the state and thus receives a presumptively official status, owing to its endorsement by the state. The process by which the annotations contained in the O.C.G.A. are adopted and merged with the statutory content therein constitutes the exercise of such ostensible authority, rendering the O.C.G.A. an uncopyrightable edict of government.","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Uncopyrightability of Edicts of Government\",\"authors\":\"Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Peter S. Menell\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3477564\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court appeal of Georgia, et al., v. Public.Resource.Org., explores the interplay of copyright law and the edicts of government doctrine. The “edicts of government” doctrine was first validated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of nineteenth century cases. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). While the doctrine has never been directly recognized in the express wording of the copyright statute, it is nevertheless firmly rooted in foundational copyright principles that are themselves reflected in the text of the statute. \\n \\nThree foundational copyright principles buttress the doctrine. First, copyrightable authorship does not extend to official announcements of law, the hallmark of edicts of government. Authorship as requires personalization, an attribute that is antithetical to official pronouncements of law, which are generated in an impersonal and ex officio manner. Second, all edicts of government, as legal texts, are methods of operation, rendering them uncopyrightable. Third, authentic statements of law entail the merger of idea and expression insofar as the expression underlying edicts of government are capable of being expressed in only a limited number of ways in order to preserve its authenticity. \\n \\nConsequently, the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.) is not copyrightable. Petitioners concede that the statutory content of the O.C.G.A. is uncopyrightable. The annotations incorporated into the O.C.G.A. by the state legislature bear the imprimatur of the state and are therefore produced under the ostensible authority of the state, which renders them an edict of government. Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, an edict does not need to have the force of law to qualify as an uncopyrightable edict of government. The Supreme Court’s precedents contradict this position. Instead, faithful reading of these precedents suggest that something becomes an uncopyrightable edict of government when it is produced under the ostensible authority of the state and thus receives a presumptively official status, owing to its endorsement by the state. The process by which the annotations contained in the O.C.G.A. are adopted and merged with the statutory content therein constitutes the exercise of such ostensible authority, rendering the O.C.G.A. an uncopyrightable edict of government.\",\"PeriodicalId\":83406,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"University of California, Davis law review\",\"volume\":\"37 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-10-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"University of California, Davis law review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477564\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of California, Davis law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477564","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本法庭之友摘要在乔治亚等人诉Public.Resource.Org最高法院上诉案中提交。,探讨了版权法和政府主义法令的相互作用。“政府法令”原则最初由美国最高法院在19世纪的一系列案件中证实。惠顿诉彼得斯案,33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834);班克斯诉曼彻斯特案,128 U.S. 244 (1888);卡拉汉诉迈耶斯案,128 U.S. 617(1888)。虽然这一理论从未在版权法规的明确措辞中得到直接承认,但它仍然牢固地植根于基本的版权原则,这些原则本身也反映在法规的案文中。三个基本的版权原则支撑着这一理论。首先,受版权保护的作者身份并不适用于政府法令的标志——官方法律公告。作者身份需要个性化,这是一种与法律的官方声明相对立的属性,后者是以客观和当然的方式产生的。其次,所有政府法令作为法律文本,都是操作方法,因此不具有版权。第三,真正的法律陈述需要思想和表达的结合,因为作为政府法令基础的表达只能用有限的几种方式来表达,以保持其真实性。因此,《乔治亚州官方法典》(o.c.g.a)不具有版权。请愿者承认《O.C.G.A.》的法定内容不受版权保护。由州立法机关纳入《O.C.G.A.》的注释得到了该州的认可,因此是在该州的表面权威下制作的,这使它们成为政府的法令。与请愿人的论点相反,一项法令不需要具有法律效力就可以成为不受版权保护的政府法令。最高法院的判例与这一立场相矛盾。相反,对这些先例的忠实解读表明,当某种东西是在表面上的国家权威下产生的,并且由于得到国家的认可而获得推定的官方地位时,它就变成了不受版权保护的政府法令。O.C.G.A.所载的注释被采纳并与其中的法定内容合并的过程构成了这种表面上的权力的行使,使O.C.G.A.成为一项不受版权保护的政府法令。
This amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court appeal of Georgia, et al., v. Public.Resource.Org., explores the interplay of copyright law and the edicts of government doctrine. The “edicts of government” doctrine was first validated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of nineteenth century cases. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). While the doctrine has never been directly recognized in the express wording of the copyright statute, it is nevertheless firmly rooted in foundational copyright principles that are themselves reflected in the text of the statute.
Three foundational copyright principles buttress the doctrine. First, copyrightable authorship does not extend to official announcements of law, the hallmark of edicts of government. Authorship as requires personalization, an attribute that is antithetical to official pronouncements of law, which are generated in an impersonal and ex officio manner. Second, all edicts of government, as legal texts, are methods of operation, rendering them uncopyrightable. Third, authentic statements of law entail the merger of idea and expression insofar as the expression underlying edicts of government are capable of being expressed in only a limited number of ways in order to preserve its authenticity.
Consequently, the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.) is not copyrightable. Petitioners concede that the statutory content of the O.C.G.A. is uncopyrightable. The annotations incorporated into the O.C.G.A. by the state legislature bear the imprimatur of the state and are therefore produced under the ostensible authority of the state, which renders them an edict of government. Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, an edict does not need to have the force of law to qualify as an uncopyrightable edict of government. The Supreme Court’s precedents contradict this position. Instead, faithful reading of these precedents suggest that something becomes an uncopyrightable edict of government when it is produced under the ostensible authority of the state and thus receives a presumptively official status, owing to its endorsement by the state. The process by which the annotations contained in the O.C.G.A. are adopted and merged with the statutory content therein constitutes the exercise of such ostensible authority, rendering the O.C.G.A. an uncopyrightable edict of government.