高水平的表现是否意味着滥用兴奋剂?反兴奋剂机构的绩效相关策略

Christian Salzmann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了一个基于性能的测试理论模型。在这个模型中,兴奋剂机构观察异质性运动员的高或低表现,然后决定对谁进行检测。我们证明了高绩效和低绩效之间存在一个正检验概率的内部均衡。与直觉相反,表现不佳的人会比表现出色的人接受更多的测试。我们表明,能力较差的运动员比能力较强的运动员更容易吸毒。此外,我们还表明,兴奋剂滥用的总体情况与人才的分布无关,而仅取决于兴奋剂检测机构的收益和成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does High Performance Bespeak Doping Abuse? A Performance Related Strategy for Anti-Doping Agencies
We present a theoretical model for performance-based testing. In this model, the doping agency observes either high or low performance from heterogeneous athletes and then decides whom to test. We show that there is an interior equilibrium with a positive testing probability for high and low performers. Counter-intuitively, low performers will be tested more often than high performers. We show that less-able athletes will dope more often than more-able athletes. Furthermore, we show that the overall doping abuse is independent of the distribution of talent, but only depends on the agency’s benefits and costs of doping tests.
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