如何信任X.509证书?现有信任方法分析

A. Wazan, R. Laborde, D. Chadwick, F. Barrère, A. Benzekri
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引用次数: 4

摘要

公钥基础设施(PKI)基于原始X.509标准定义的信任模型,由三个实体组成:证书颁发机构、证书持有人(主体)和依赖方。CA在主体和RP之间扮演可信第三方的角色。当RP从未知主体接收到由未知CA签名的证书时,会引发信任评估问题。已经提出了不同的方法来处理此信任问题。我们认为这些方法只适用于封闭的部署模型,其中rp也是主体,而不能适用于开放的部署模型,因为它们不是主体。我们的目标是找出现有信任方法中的缺陷,这些方法试图帮助rp对Internet中的证书做出信任决策,并介绍基于信任代理的新X.509方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Can I Trust an X.509 Certificate? An Analysis of the Existing Trust Approaches
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is based on a trust model defined by the original X.509 standard and is composed of three entities: the Certification Authority, the certificate holder (subject) and the Relying Party. The CA plays the role of a trusted third party between the subject and the RP. A trust evaluation problem is raised when an RP receives a certificate from an unknown subject that is signed by an unknown CA. Different approaches have been proposed to handle this trust problem. We argue that these approaches work only in the closed deployment model where RPs are also subjects, but cannot work in the open deployment model where they are not. Our objective is to identify the deficiencies in the existing trust approaches that try to help RPs to make trust decisions about certificates in the Internet, and to introduce the new X.509 approach based on a trust broker.
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