一尘不染的沙箱:使用磨损工件逃避恶意软件分析系统

N. Miramirkhani, Mahathi Priya Appini, Nick Nikiforakis, M. Polychronakis
{"title":"一尘不染的沙箱:使用磨损工件逃避恶意软件分析系统","authors":"N. Miramirkhani, Mahathi Priya Appini, Nick Nikiforakis, M. Polychronakis","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.42","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Malware sandboxes, widely used by antivirus companies, mobile application marketplaces, threat detection appliances, and security researchers, face the challenge of environment-aware malware that alters its behavior once it detects that it is being executed on an analysis environment. Recent efforts attempt to deal with this problem mostly by ensuring that well-known properties of analysis environments are replaced with realistic values, and that any instrumentation artifacts remain hidden. For sandboxes implemented using virtual machines, this can be achieved by scrubbing vendor-specific drivers, processes, BIOS versions, and other VM-revealing indicators, while more sophisticated sandboxes move away from emulation-based and virtualization-based systems towards bare-metal hosts. We observe that as the fidelity and transparency of dynamic malware analysis systems improves, malware authors can resort to other system characteristics that are indicative of artificial environments. We present a novel class of sandbox evasion techniques that exploit the \"wear and tear\" that inevitably occurs on real systems as a result of normal use. By moving beyond how realistic a system looks like, to how realistic its past use looks like, malware can effectively evade even sandboxes that do not expose any instrumentation indicators, including bare-metal systems. We investigate the feasibility of this evasion strategy by conducting a large-scale study of wear-and-tear artifacts collected from real user devices and publicly available malware analysis services. The results of our evaluation are alarming: using simple decision trees derived from the analyzed data, malware can determine that a system is an artificial environment and not a real user device with an accuracy of 92.86%. As a step towards defending against wear-and-tear malware evasion, we develop statistical models that capture a system's age and degree of use, which can be used to aid sandbox operators in creating system images that exhibit a realistic wear-and-tear state.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"1 1","pages":"1009-1024"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"95","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Spotless Sandboxes: Evading Malware Analysis Systems Using Wear-and-Tear Artifacts\",\"authors\":\"N. Miramirkhani, Mahathi Priya Appini, Nick Nikiforakis, M. Polychronakis\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SP.2017.42\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Malware sandboxes, widely used by antivirus companies, mobile application marketplaces, threat detection appliances, and security researchers, face the challenge of environment-aware malware that alters its behavior once it detects that it is being executed on an analysis environment. Recent efforts attempt to deal with this problem mostly by ensuring that well-known properties of analysis environments are replaced with realistic values, and that any instrumentation artifacts remain hidden. For sandboxes implemented using virtual machines, this can be achieved by scrubbing vendor-specific drivers, processes, BIOS versions, and other VM-revealing indicators, while more sophisticated sandboxes move away from emulation-based and virtualization-based systems towards bare-metal hosts. We observe that as the fidelity and transparency of dynamic malware analysis systems improves, malware authors can resort to other system characteristics that are indicative of artificial environments. We present a novel class of sandbox evasion techniques that exploit the \\\"wear and tear\\\" that inevitably occurs on real systems as a result of normal use. By moving beyond how realistic a system looks like, to how realistic its past use looks like, malware can effectively evade even sandboxes that do not expose any instrumentation indicators, including bare-metal systems. We investigate the feasibility of this evasion strategy by conducting a large-scale study of wear-and-tear artifacts collected from real user devices and publicly available malware analysis services. The results of our evaluation are alarming: using simple decision trees derived from the analyzed data, malware can determine that a system is an artificial environment and not a real user device with an accuracy of 92.86%. As a step towards defending against wear-and-tear malware evasion, we develop statistical models that capture a system's age and degree of use, which can be used to aid sandbox operators in creating system images that exhibit a realistic wear-and-tear state.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6502,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"1009-1024\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-05-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"95\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.42\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.42","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 95

摘要

恶意软件沙箱被反病毒公司、移动应用程序市场、威胁检测设备和安全研究人员广泛使用,它面临着环境感知恶意软件的挑战,一旦检测到它正在分析环境中执行,它就会改变其行为。最近的努力试图处理这个问题,主要是通过确保分析环境的众所周知的属性被实际的值所取代,并且任何仪器工件都是隐藏的。对于使用虚拟机实现的沙箱,这可以通过清除特定于供应商的驱动程序、进程、BIOS版本和其他vm指示符来实现,而更复杂的沙箱则从基于仿真和虚拟化的系统转向裸机主机。我们观察到,随着动态恶意软件分析系统的保真度和透明度的提高,恶意软件作者可以求助于表明人工环境的其他系统特征。我们提出了一种新型的沙盒规避技术,该技术利用了由于正常使用而不可避免地在实际系统中发生的“磨损”。通过超越系统的逼真程度,达到其过去使用的逼真程度,恶意软件甚至可以有效地避开没有暴露任何仪表指标的沙箱,包括裸机系统。我们通过对从真实用户设备和公开可用的恶意软件分析服务收集的磨损工件进行大规模研究,来调查这种规避策略的可行性。我们的评估结果令人震惊:使用从分析数据中得出的简单决策树,恶意软件可以确定系统是人工环境而不是真正的用户设备,准确率为92.86%。作为防御磨损恶意软件逃避的一步,我们开发了统计模型来捕获系统的年龄和使用程度,这可以用来帮助沙箱操作员创建显示真实磨损状态的系统映像。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Spotless Sandboxes: Evading Malware Analysis Systems Using Wear-and-Tear Artifacts
Malware sandboxes, widely used by antivirus companies, mobile application marketplaces, threat detection appliances, and security researchers, face the challenge of environment-aware malware that alters its behavior once it detects that it is being executed on an analysis environment. Recent efforts attempt to deal with this problem mostly by ensuring that well-known properties of analysis environments are replaced with realistic values, and that any instrumentation artifacts remain hidden. For sandboxes implemented using virtual machines, this can be achieved by scrubbing vendor-specific drivers, processes, BIOS versions, and other VM-revealing indicators, while more sophisticated sandboxes move away from emulation-based and virtualization-based systems towards bare-metal hosts. We observe that as the fidelity and transparency of dynamic malware analysis systems improves, malware authors can resort to other system characteristics that are indicative of artificial environments. We present a novel class of sandbox evasion techniques that exploit the "wear and tear" that inevitably occurs on real systems as a result of normal use. By moving beyond how realistic a system looks like, to how realistic its past use looks like, malware can effectively evade even sandboxes that do not expose any instrumentation indicators, including bare-metal systems. We investigate the feasibility of this evasion strategy by conducting a large-scale study of wear-and-tear artifacts collected from real user devices and publicly available malware analysis services. The results of our evaluation are alarming: using simple decision trees derived from the analyzed data, malware can determine that a system is an artificial environment and not a real user device with an accuracy of 92.86%. As a step towards defending against wear-and-tear malware evasion, we develop statistical models that capture a system's age and degree of use, which can be used to aid sandbox operators in creating system images that exhibit a realistic wear-and-tear state.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信