{"title":"询问董事的双重角色","authors":"Renée B. Adams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1362339","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a large survey of directors to investigate variation in directors' dual roles as advisors and monitors of management. I examine whether the advisory role encourages information exchange between the CEO and the board, as suggested by Adams and Ferreira (2007). I also examine factors related to directors' perceptions of their roles. Amongst others the data suggests that a) directors vary in their perceptions of their roles and directors' roles affect their perceptions of information exchange, b) directors who agree more that they primarily monitor management perceive that they participate less in boardroom discussion than directors who agree that the CEO often asks them for advice, c) directors with a stronger personal relationship with management perceive their advisory role to be more important, and d) directors on boards with more decision-making power perceive their monitoring role to be less important relative to their advisory role. The results are robust to using Heckman selection techniques to address nonresponse bias. Overall, the data suggests that monitoring alone may not be sufficient for good governance.","PeriodicalId":47599,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2009-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"77","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Asking Directors About Their Dual Roles\",\"authors\":\"Renée B. Adams\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1362339\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper uses a large survey of directors to investigate variation in directors' dual roles as advisors and monitors of management. I examine whether the advisory role encourages information exchange between the CEO and the board, as suggested by Adams and Ferreira (2007). I also examine factors related to directors' perceptions of their roles. Amongst others the data suggests that a) directors vary in their perceptions of their roles and directors' roles affect their perceptions of information exchange, b) directors who agree more that they primarily monitor management perceive that they participate less in boardroom discussion than directors who agree that the CEO often asks them for advice, c) directors with a stronger personal relationship with management perceive their advisory role to be more important, and d) directors on boards with more decision-making power perceive their monitoring role to be less important relative to their advisory role. The results are robust to using Heckman selection techniques to address nonresponse bias. Overall, the data suggests that monitoring alone may not be sufficient for good governance.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47599,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Journal of Finance\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-03-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"77\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Journal of Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1362339\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1362339","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses a large survey of directors to investigate variation in directors' dual roles as advisors and monitors of management. I examine whether the advisory role encourages information exchange between the CEO and the board, as suggested by Adams and Ferreira (2007). I also examine factors related to directors' perceptions of their roles. Amongst others the data suggests that a) directors vary in their perceptions of their roles and directors' roles affect their perceptions of information exchange, b) directors who agree more that they primarily monitor management perceive that they participate less in boardroom discussion than directors who agree that the CEO often asks them for advice, c) directors with a stronger personal relationship with management perceive their advisory role to be more important, and d) directors on boards with more decision-making power perceive their monitoring role to be less important relative to their advisory role. The results are robust to using Heckman selection techniques to address nonresponse bias. Overall, the data suggests that monitoring alone may not be sufficient for good governance.
期刊介绍:
The European Journal of Finance publishes a full range of research into theoretical and empirical topics in finance. The emphasis is on issues that reflect European interests and concerns. The journal aims to publish work that is motivated by significant issues in the theory or practice of finance. The journal promotes communication between finance academics and practitioners by providing a vehicle for the publication of research into European issues, stimulating research in finance within Europe, encouraging the international exchange of ideas, theories and the practical application of methodologies and playing a positive role in the development of the infrastructure for finance research.