竞争市场中的产品设计外包

Kangkang Wang, Chunhua Wu
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引用次数: 2

摘要

原始设计制造商(ODM)是一种新的全球外包形式。传统的外包只是将产品的生产从品牌转移到制造商。相比之下,ODM不仅为品牌生产产品,而且还设计产品。利用分析模型,我们研究了企业的战略设计外包决策。在水平差异化市场上竞争的两家公司决定是自己设计产品还是将产品设计外包给ODM。我们考虑了两种不同的渠道结构——一种是每个公司都有一个独家的ODM合作伙伴,另一种是两个公司都有一个共同的ODM合作伙伴。我们发现,对称和非对称外包结果都可能出现在均衡中,即使竞争企业被假设为完全对称。令人惊讶的是,企业的外包激励可能与设计产品的成本呈负相关,即当成本高时,两家公司都不外包产品设计,当成本处于中间范围时,两家公司都外包产品设计,而当成本低时,两家公司都外包产品设计。我们还发现,当渠道中存在共同的ODM时,企业更有可能外包产品设计,而不是当渠道中存在独家ODM时。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Product Design Outsourcing in Competitive Markets
Original design manufacturers (ODM) is a new form of global outsourcing. Traditional outsourcing only transfers the production of a product from brands to manufacturers. An ODM, in contrast, not only manufactures the product for a brand, but also designs the product. Using an analytical model, we investigate strategic design outsourcing decisions of firms. Two firms competing in a horizontally differentiated market decide whether to design the products by themselves or to outsource product design to an ODM. We consider two different channel structures – one in which each firm partners with an exclusive ODM and the other in which both firms partner with a common ODM. We find that both symmetric and asymmetric outsourcing outcomes can arise in the equilibrium, even though competing firms are assumed to be completely symmetric. Surprisingly, firms’ outsourcing incentive can be inversely related to the cost of designing a product, i.e., neither firm outsources product design when the cost is high, one firm outsources product design and the other insources when the cost is in an intermediate range, and both firms outsource product design when the cost is low. We also find that firms are more likely to outsource product design when there is a common ODM in the channel than when there are exclusive ODMs.
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