{"title":"关于讨价还价的传统智慧","authors":"Chongmin Kim","doi":"10.17256/JER.2013.18.2.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study a version of the Nash demand game, in which each player demands a portion of the pie of size 1 simultaneously and receives a share proportional to his demand if such an allocation is feasible or receives zero otherwise. The main purpose of this paper is to show how an equal split emerges as a convention in a bargaining situation, and explain why it has survival value. In this paper, the equal split in the Nash demand game emerges in the long run through imitation and mistakes.","PeriodicalId":90860,"journal":{"name":"International journal of economic research","volume":"107 1","pages":"191-204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A note on the conventional wisdom in bargaining\",\"authors\":\"Chongmin Kim\",\"doi\":\"10.17256/JER.2013.18.2.004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study a version of the Nash demand game, in which each player demands a portion of the pie of size 1 simultaneously and receives a share proportional to his demand if such an allocation is feasible or receives zero otherwise. The main purpose of this paper is to show how an equal split emerges as a convention in a bargaining situation, and explain why it has survival value. In this paper, the equal split in the Nash demand game emerges in the long run through imitation and mistakes.\",\"PeriodicalId\":90860,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International journal of economic research\",\"volume\":\"107 1\",\"pages\":\"191-204\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International journal of economic research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2013.18.2.004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International journal of economic research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17256/JER.2013.18.2.004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a version of the Nash demand game, in which each player demands a portion of the pie of size 1 simultaneously and receives a share proportional to his demand if such an allocation is feasible or receives zero otherwise. The main purpose of this paper is to show how an equal split emerges as a convention in a bargaining situation, and explain why it has survival value. In this paper, the equal split in the Nash demand game emerges in the long run through imitation and mistakes.