关于讨价还价的传统智慧

Chongmin Kim
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们研究了纳什需求博弈的一个版本,在这个博弈中,每个参与者同时要求大小为1的饼的一部分,如果这种分配是可行的,那么每个参与者都会得到与他的需求成比例的份额,否则会得到零份额。本文的主要目的是展示平等分割如何在讨价还价的情况下成为一种惯例,并解释为什么它具有生存价值。在本文中,纳什需求博弈中的平等分裂是在长期的模仿和错误中产生的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A note on the conventional wisdom in bargaining
We study a version of the Nash demand game, in which each player demands a portion of the pie of size 1 simultaneously and receives a share proportional to his demand if such an allocation is feasible or receives zero otherwise. The main purpose of this paper is to show how an equal split emerges as a convention in a bargaining situation, and explain why it has survival value. In this paper, the equal split in the Nash demand game emerges in the long run through imitation and mistakes.
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