妇女在世俗化中的作用

IF 3.6 3区 哲学 0 RELIGION
Callum G. Brown
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New theories abounded from the churched community to contain the intellectual threat: people believed but had stopped belonging; the mainstream churches were in decline but not popular faith; the parish structure of old Europe was disintegrating and making way for diversity— house churches, megachurches, pick ‘n’ mix faith; religiosity was giving way to spirituality; new age religion was dismantling denominationalism; and the majority secular people were now expecting the minority faithful to conduct the moral work of the whole community (Berger et al., 2008; Davie, 1994, 2000; Heelas, 1996; Roof, 1993; Wuthnow, 2007). Though such ideas still keep coming, if truth be told, what is happening to faith now takes second place to what is happening with nonfaith: the rise of morality without religion, growing proportions of people identifying as “nones,” atheists, and agnostics, and declining churchgoing and membership (Brown et al., 2022). 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引用次数: 1

摘要

世俗化使许多信仰学者感到困惑。在20世纪60年代和70年代,它曾被认为是现代化的一个方面,但在20世纪90年代和21世纪初,一场绝望的宗教攻击的兴起见证了这一概念的兴起,因为它本身就是世俗主义者和无神论者的灵感,是宗教敌人的智力阴谋。新的理论从教会团体中涌现出来,以遏制这种思想上的威胁:人们有信仰,但已经失去了归属感;主流教会在衰落,但没有流行的信仰;旧欧洲的教区结构正在瓦解,让位于多样化——家庭教堂、特大教堂、精选和混合信仰;宗教信仰让位于灵性;新时代宗教正在瓦解教派主义;多数世俗的人现在期望少数的忠实信徒进行整个社区的道德工作(Berger et al., 2008;戴维,1994,2000;Heelas, 1996;屋顶,1993;伍,2007)。虽然这样的想法仍在不断涌现,但如果说实话,现在发生在信仰上的事情比发生在非信仰上的事情要次要:没有宗教的道德的兴起,越来越多的人认为自己是“无信仰者”、无神论者和不可知论者,以及去教堂和成员人数的减少(Brown et al., 2022)。对西方教会来说,最苦乐参半的是信仰中最忠实的群体——女基督徒的衰落。在基督教家庭一度以女性的纯洁和圣洁为装饰的地方,女权主义的冲动已经大大削弱了道德的神圣性。学者们在意识到道德、文化和人口方面的危险正在瓦解西方国家悬于女性纯洁之上的宗教道德体系方面进展缓慢。新的学术研究已经在塑造这种替代叙事,现在菲利普·詹金斯(Philip Jenkins)的著作《生育与信仰》(Fertility and Faith)提供了对世俗化的最新、迄今为止最全面的人口统计学理解。这本书不可避免地必须重新关注性别问题,从二十世纪中叶开始,基督教和犹太教的社会意义正在下降。我们都应该感谢他重新部署了社会科学的视角来审视西方世界——包括欧洲、北美、澳大拉西亚和日本——信仰的衰落,但他的论述也探讨了其对其他大陆的影响。但在考虑詹金斯专著的优点之前,有必要重申一下,对宗教衰落的研究不是、不应该、也不可能仅仅是一门人口科学。如果没有定量和定性(有些人认为是后现代主义)方法论的融合,就不可能完全理解始于20世纪25年代的信仰变化的方向,正如詹金斯所指出的那样,这种变化现在正以迅猛的速度向前推进。学术界花了相当长的时间才把人口统计学作为研究世俗化的主要概念工具。推动力始于20世纪40年代至60年代之间的宗教社会学,它提高了人们按年龄、性别、社会阶层和种族来理解不断变化的做礼拜者群体的前景。欧洲学者关注的——可以说是痴迷的——是社会阶级。直到二十世纪中叶,基督教在社会和社会中的地位
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The agency of women in secularization
Secularization confounds many faith scholars. Where once in the 1960s and 1970s it was accepted as a facet of modernization, the 1990s and 2000s witnessed the rise of a desperate religious assault on the concept as in itself secularist and atheist-inspired—an intellectual conspiracy of religions’ enemies. New theories abounded from the churched community to contain the intellectual threat: people believed but had stopped belonging; the mainstream churches were in decline but not popular faith; the parish structure of old Europe was disintegrating and making way for diversity— house churches, megachurches, pick ‘n’ mix faith; religiosity was giving way to spirituality; new age religion was dismantling denominationalism; and the majority secular people were now expecting the minority faithful to conduct the moral work of the whole community (Berger et al., 2008; Davie, 1994, 2000; Heelas, 1996; Roof, 1993; Wuthnow, 2007). Though such ideas still keep coming, if truth be told, what is happening to faith now takes second place to what is happening with nonfaith: the rise of morality without religion, growing proportions of people identifying as “nones,” atheists, and agnostics, and declining churchgoing and membership (Brown et al., 2022). And most bittersweet for the churches in the west is the waning of the faith’s most faithful: Christian women. Where once moral purity and sanctity of womanhood adorned the Christian family, feminist impulses have done much to de-sanctify morality. Scholarship has been slow to perceive the concatenation of moral, cultural, and demographic dangers that are unraveling the religious moral system hung in western nations upon female purity. New scholarship has already been sculpting this replacement narrative, and now Philip Jenkins’ book, Fertility and Faith, offers the latest and so far most comprehensive demographic understanding of secularization. The book inevitably must refocus attention upon the gender question in the declining social significance of Christianity and Judaism from the middle of the twentieth century onwards. We should all be grateful for his redeployment of a social-science lens upon the decline of faith in the western world—broadly Europe, North America, Australasia, and Japan, but his treatment also explores its consequences for other continents. But before considering the merits of Jenkins’ monograph, it is important to restate firmly that the study of religious decline is not, should not, and cannot be a demographic science alone. Without the fusion of quantitative and qualitative (some would argue postmodernist) methodologies, there can be no full understanding of the direction of the faith change that started in the third quarter of the twentieth century and which is now advancing—as Jenkins notes—with vigorous speed. It has taken scholarship some considerable time to place demography as a major conceptual tool with which to study secularization. The impetus began in the sociology of religion between the 1940s and 1960s, raising the prospect of understanding the changing constituencies of churchgoers by age, gender, social class, and ethnicity. It was social class upon which European scholars focused— arguably obsessed. Until the mid-twentieth century, the place of Christianity in the social and
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