随机填充缓存架构

Fangfei Liu, R. Lee
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引用次数: 221

摘要

正常运行的缓存已被证明可以通过各种类型的缓存侧通道攻击泄露关键机密,如加密密钥。这使强加密所提供的安全性失效,并允许违反机密性、假冒攻击和虚假服务。因此,未来的缓存设计必须考虑安全性,理想情况下不能降低性能和功率效率。我们引入了一种新的缓存侧通道攻击分类:基于争用的攻击和基于重用的攻击。以前的安全缓存设计只针对基于争用的攻击,我们表明它们不能防御基于重用的攻击。我们展示了一个令人惊讶的见解,即缓存的基本需求获取策略是一个安全漏洞,它会导致基于重用的攻击成功。我们提出了一种新的随机填充缓存架构,该架构在可配置的邻域窗口内用随机缓存填充取代需求提取。我们展示了随机填充缓存不会降低性能,事实上,对于某些类型的应用程序,它可以提高性能。我们还表明,它提供了针对基于重用的攻击的信息理论安全性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Random Fill Cache Architecture
Correctly functioning caches have been shown to leak critical secrets like encryption keys, through various types of cache side-channel attacks. This nullifies the security provided by strong encryption and allows confidentiality breaches, impersonation attacks and fake services. Hence, future cache designs must consider security, ideally without degrading performance and power efficiency. We introduce a new classification of cache side channel attacks: contention based attacks and reuse based attacks. Previous secure cache designs target only contention based attacks, and we show that they cannot defend against reuse based attacks. We show the surprising insight that the fundamental demand fetch policy of a cache is a security vulnerability that causes the success of reuse based attacks. We propose a novel random fill cache architecture that replaces demand fetch with random cache fill within a configurable neighborhood window. We show that our random fill cache does not degrade performance, and in fact, improves the performance for some types of applications. We also show that it provides information-theoretic security against reuse based attacks.
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