联邦-州地位差距:如何在没有第三条地位的联邦法院执行联邦法律

P. Salib, David K. Suska
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引用次数: 0

摘要

你也可以根据薪酬条款起诉唐纳德·特朗普!自就职日以来,由于特朗普总统拒绝剥离某些资产,已经有几起针对他的诉讼。他们声称,特朗普的商业利益与宪法第一条的薪酬条款(Emoluments Clause)相冲突。这条晦涩的条款禁止某些联邦官员接受外国君主或国家的任何津贴或收益。例如,这些诉讼声称,一名外国政要在曼哈顿的特朗普国际酒店(Trump International Hotel)预订房间将构成非法薪酬。大多数评论人士对原告胜诉的前景泼了一盆冷水。大多数人认为,问题在于原告无法证明任何假定违反薪酬条款的行为造成了具体和具体的损害。用法律术语来说,它们缺乏第三条的地位。没有人提出的是,原告不需要第三条资格来对特朗普执行薪酬条款。每个人都认为这些诉讼必须在联邦诉讼制度下生存或消亡。但是,正如我们所争论的,第三条的地位本质上从来不是执行联邦法律的障碍。事实上,原告甚至可能在不具备宪法第三条规定的情况下赢得美国最高法院的是非曲实裁决。如果我们是对的,这是一件大事。联邦常设原则被理解为限制联邦法院履行咨询职能。它还制衡国会权力,保留行政部门执行联邦法律的宪法特权。我们对这种公认的智慧提出质疑,并认为最高法院(也许是无意中)创造了一条途径,诉讼当事人可以通过该途径绕过第三条的常设要求,从而削弱了该原则的效力。这远远超出了薪酬条款的含义;由于第三条地位的限制,许多宪法和法定条款长期以来被认为实际上无法执行。本文描绘了无诉讼原告在执行联邦法律和在美国最高法院提起诉讼时可能遵循的路线。它还为法律词典引入了一个新术语:联邦-州地位差距。这个术语描述了第三条常设原则和许多州相对宽松的原则之间的空间。我们没有发现这个空间;每个上过或教过联邦管辖权课程的人都知道这一点。但我们确实认为它没有得到充分的重视。这就是本文开始填补的文献空白。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Federal–state Standing Gap: How to Enforce Federal Law in Federal Court without Article III Standing
You, too, can sue Donald Trump under the Emoluments Clause! Since Inauguration Day several lawsuits have been filed against President Trump because of his refusal to divest certain assets. They assert that Trump’s business interests conflict with the Emoluments Clause of Article I. That arcane provision forbids certain federal officials from accepting any perquisite or gain from a foreign monarch or state. The suits contend, for example, that a foreign dignitary’s booking of a room at the Trump International Hotel in Manhattan would constitute an unlawful emolument. Most commentators have thrown cold water on the prospect of any plaintiff prevailing. The trouble, most argue, is that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury from any putative violation of the Emoluments Clause. In legalese, they lack Article III standing. What no one has suggested is that plaintiffs do not need Article III standing to enforce the Emoluments Clause against Trump. Everyone assumes that these suits must live or die under federal standing doctrine. But, as we argue, Article III standing is essentially never a barrier to enforcing federal law. Indeed, plaintiffs may even win a merits ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court without ever possessing the elements of Article III standing. If we are right, it is a big deal. Federal standing doctrine is understood to restrain federal courts’ from performing an advisory function. It also checks congressional power, preserving the Executive’s constitutional prerogative to enforce federal law. We challenge this received wisdom and argue that the Supreme Court has — perhaps unwittingly — created a route by which litigants may circumvent Article III’s standing requirements, diminishing the doctrine’s force. This has implications far beyond the Emoluments Clause; many constitutional and statutory provisions have long been thought effectively unenforceable because of the strictures of Article III standing. This Article charts the course that no-standing plaintiffs may follow to enforce federal law and land in the U.S. Supreme Court. It also introduces a new term to the legal lexicon: the Federal–State Standing Gap. This term describes the space between Article III standing doctrine and the comparatively lax doctrine of many states. We did not discover this space; everyone who has taken or taught a course on federal jurisdiction knows about it. But we do think it has gone underappreciated. And that is the gap in the literature that this Article begins to fill.
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