自由主义和共同的使命

N. Sage
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在一些遵守普通法的国家旅行时,你可能会在路上遇到一个陌生人,他向你寻求帮助——食物、住所、坐车去下一个城镇,或者帮助他们开车。你也许能够提供这种帮助,他们也愿意为此补偿你。然而,你有权无视他们的诉求,从另一边走过去。这条引人注目的规则吸引了法律理论家的注意,尤其是广泛自由主义传统的支持者和反对者。可以说,这条规则表明了普通法——或者至少是管理私人的那部分法律——对人际关系中个人自由或自治的强烈概念的承诺。事实上,对于一些受康德法哲学影响的理论家来说,这条规则表明,私人个体在本质上是相互独立的。但是,如果在某个受“美好的旧普通法”约束的国家,你经营着一家向公众提供某些商品、服务或设施的企业,比如一家提供食宿的客栈,或者一条定期客运的铁路,甚至是一家修理坏马蹄铁的铁匠铺,那会怎么样呢?在这里,法律不允许你忽视一个陌生人,他来到你的住所寻求你的帮助,并愿意偿还你。如果你在没有充分理由的情况下拒绝了他们,你将承担损害赔偿责任。这一引人注目的规则在理论上引起的关注较少,但却是Hanoch Dagan在他的《自由财产理论》第五章中讨论的一个关键证据。达根试图阐明一般私法的自由主义理论,特别是财产法,这比康德的理论更有说服力。根据达根的观点,私人个体是自主的或自我决定的。但它们不仅是相互独立的;相反,他们之间的关系更为慷慨。每个人都有义务照顾彼此的自决——这可能意味着采取积极的措施来帮助对方。达根认为,这一原理解释了,
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Liberalism and the Common Callings
Travelling through some country that observes the common law you might come across a stranger on the road who asks for help—for food, or shelter, or a ride to the next town, or assistance with their vehicle. You might be able to supply this assistance, and they willing to reimburse you for it. Nevertheless, you would be entitled to ignore their appeal and pass by on the other side. This striking rule has attracted the attention of legal theorists, especially proponents and opponents of the broadly liberal tradition. The rule arguably shows the commitment of the common law—or at least the part of the law governing private individuals—to a strong conception of individual freedom or autonomy in interpersonal relations. Indeed, for some theorists influenced by Kant’s legal philosophy, the rule shows that private individuals are essentially independent of each other. But what if, in some country subject to ‘the good old common law’, you ran a business that provided certain goods, services, or facilities to the public—an inn offering meals and rooms for the night, or a railway with a regular passenger service, or even a forge for fixing broken horseshoes? Here the law would not allow you to ignore a stranger who arrived at your premises seeking your help and willing to reimburse you. You would be liable for damages if you turned them away without good reason. This striking rule has attracted less theoretical attention, but is one key piece of evidence Hanoch Dagan discusses in chapter five of his Liberal Theory of Property. Dagan seeks to articulate a liberal theory of private law in general, and of property law in particular, which is more persuasive than the Kantian theory. According to Dagan, private individuals are autonomous or self-determining. But they are not merely independent of each other; rather they stand in a more generous sort of relation. Each person is obliged to accommodate each other’s self-determination—which may mean taking active steps to help. Dagan argues that this principle explains, among other things,
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