Douglas Silveira, Ricardo Barbosa Lima Mendes Oscar
{"title":"新兴市场经济体的通胀目标制:投资还是不投资?","authors":"Douglas Silveira, Ricardo Barbosa Lima Mendes Oscar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3920607","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We propose a stochastic learning rule through an Agent-based Model (ABM) to understand how emerging market economies (EMEs) can achieve high levels of investment, given the announced inflation target rate. The central banks act as a pseudo-player, choosing between the pursued target inflation rate or a negative inflation rate. By taking this action as given, bounded-rational firms and workers iteratively play a two-population well-mixed evolutionary game to make investment decisions. Our findings show that when inflation converges to its target, less the central planners' effort to reach the steady-state with investment coordination. When central banks target a negative inflation rate, it can speed up the EMEs' convergence to a steady-state with agents coordinating their investment strategies. It shed some light on central banks' transparency and credibility to avoid the so-called debt-deflation spiral, which typically increases the uncertainty in EMEs, limiting the investments in the economy.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Inflation Targeting Regimes in Emerging Market Economies: To Invest or Not to Invest?\",\"authors\":\"Douglas Silveira, Ricardo Barbosa Lima Mendes Oscar\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3920607\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We propose a stochastic learning rule through an Agent-based Model (ABM) to understand how emerging market economies (EMEs) can achieve high levels of investment, given the announced inflation target rate. The central banks act as a pseudo-player, choosing between the pursued target inflation rate or a negative inflation rate. By taking this action as given, bounded-rational firms and workers iteratively play a two-population well-mixed evolutionary game to make investment decisions. Our findings show that when inflation converges to its target, less the central planners' effort to reach the steady-state with investment coordination. When central banks target a negative inflation rate, it can speed up the EMEs' convergence to a steady-state with agents coordinating their investment strategies. It shed some light on central banks' transparency and credibility to avoid the so-called debt-deflation spiral, which typically increases the uncertainty in EMEs, limiting the investments in the economy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":10548,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal\",\"volume\":\"6 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3920607\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3920607","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Inflation Targeting Regimes in Emerging Market Economies: To Invest or Not to Invest?
We propose a stochastic learning rule through an Agent-based Model (ABM) to understand how emerging market economies (EMEs) can achieve high levels of investment, given the announced inflation target rate. The central banks act as a pseudo-player, choosing between the pursued target inflation rate or a negative inflation rate. By taking this action as given, bounded-rational firms and workers iteratively play a two-population well-mixed evolutionary game to make investment decisions. Our findings show that when inflation converges to its target, less the central planners' effort to reach the steady-state with investment coordination. When central banks target a negative inflation rate, it can speed up the EMEs' convergence to a steady-state with agents coordinating their investment strategies. It shed some light on central banks' transparency and credibility to avoid the so-called debt-deflation spiral, which typically increases the uncertainty in EMEs, limiting the investments in the economy.