本地市场工业买家农业生物质补充收集策略的博弈分析

Sun Jing-chun, Hou Lin-na
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摘要

本文揭示了局部供给市场中工业买家补充催收策略的机制。提出了一个描述市场参与者的经济行为、目标和利益的框架。运用博弈论研究了供应商和行业买家寻求促进共同利益的策略的意愿;补充收集策略特别侧重于可持续生物质供应。结论是,采用补充收集策略的工业买家将获得更多的利润,但补充收集策略对决策者的生物质利用效率较低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Game analysis on agricultural biomass supplementary collection strategies for industrial buyers in local markets
This paper reveals the mechanism of supplementary collection strategy for industrial buyers in a local supply market. A framework is presented to describe the economic behaviors, goals and interests of players in the market. Game theory is applied to investigate the willingness of suppliers and industrial buyers to seek strategies that promote the common interests; supplementary collection strategy is specially focused on sustainable biomass supply. The conclusion is that industrial buyers who adopt supplementary collection strategy will get more profits, but the supplementary collection strategy is lowly efficient in biomass utilization for the decision makers.
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