面临质押风险的内部人士是否会进行高风险的公司投资?来自中国并购的证据

IF 1.4 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Qingquan Tang, Jingjing Guo, Shiyun Zeng
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引用次数: 4

摘要

以往的研究发现,面临质押风险的内部人员会放弃风险项目,以保持其控制的私人利益。然而,我们发现有控股股东股权质押的公司倾向于发起并购,这是一个好消息,并防止股价下跌。这一现象在非国有企业和在股权质押公告日市场反应消极的企业中更为明显。此外,出于成本控制的考虑,拥有CSSP的公司会选择规模较小的目标,并在较短的时间内完成并购。然而,这种并购的长期表现更差。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do insiders facing pledging risks make risky corporate investments? Evidence from Chinese M&As
ABSTRACT Prior studies find that insiders facing pledging risks pass up risky projects to preserve their private benefits of control. However, we find that firms with controlling shareholders’ share pledges (CSSP) tend to initiate mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which signal good news and prevent the stock price from falling. This phenomenon is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and firms with negative market responses on the announcement date of share pledges. Additionally, due to cost control considerations, a firm with CSSP will choose small-size targets and complete M&As in a short time. Nevertheless, the long-term performance of such M&As is worse.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
9.10%
发文量
39
期刊介绍: The Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics (APJAE) is an international forum intended for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of economics and accounting in general. In particular, the journal encourages submissions in the following areas: Auditing, financial reporting, earnings management, financial analysts, the role of accounting information, international trade and finance, industrial organization, strategic behavior, market structure, financial contracts, corporate governance, capital markets, and financial institutions. The journal welcomes contributions related to the Asia Pacific region, and targets top quality research from scholars with diverse regional interests. The editors encourage submission of high quality manuscripts with innovative ideas. The editorial team is committed to an expedient review process.
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