{"title":"用维特根斯坦的话说,大脑和我们的私人经验之间不可逾越的本体论鸿沟的问题","authors":"Nara M. Figueiredo","doi":"10.11606/ISSN.2318-8863.DISCURSO.2019.159310","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, brain processes, and something immaterial such as private experiences is an illusion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. In order to overcome this illusion, it is necessary to clarify the foundations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field.","PeriodicalId":37350,"journal":{"name":"Discurso y Sociedad","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Problem of the Unbridgeable Ontological Gap Between the Brain and Our Private Experiences in Wittgensteinian Terms\",\"authors\":\"Nara M. Figueiredo\",\"doi\":\"10.11606/ISSN.2318-8863.DISCURSO.2019.159310\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, brain processes, and something immaterial such as private experiences is an illusion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. In order to overcome this illusion, it is necessary to clarify the foundations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37350,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Discurso y Sociedad\",\"volume\":\"24 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-06-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Discurso y Sociedad\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.2318-8863.DISCURSO.2019.159310\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Discurso y Sociedad","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.11606/ISSN.2318-8863.DISCURSO.2019.159310","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Problem of the Unbridgeable Ontological Gap Between the Brain and Our Private Experiences in Wittgensteinian Terms
The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, brain processes, and something immaterial such as private experiences is an illusion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. In order to overcome this illusion, it is necessary to clarify the foundations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field.