{"title":"修正反对神性单纯性的偶然性论证","authors":"Matthew James Collier","doi":"10.12978/jat.2021-9.120009021417","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to classical theism, God is simple. However, contemporary objections to divine simplicity abound. One of those objections has received a lot of attention recently: the contingency objection. The objection is taken to pose a threat to God's freedom. Tomaszewski argues that the argument that supports the contingency objection, however, is invalid. Herein, I supply two valid versions of the argument; thus, the classical theist is required to defuse the argument.","PeriodicalId":14947,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Analytic Theology","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Repairing the Contingency Argument against Divine Simplicity\",\"authors\":\"Matthew James Collier\",\"doi\":\"10.12978/jat.2021-9.120009021417\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"According to classical theism, God is simple. However, contemporary objections to divine simplicity abound. One of those objections has received a lot of attention recently: the contingency objection. The objection is taken to pose a threat to God's freedom. Tomaszewski argues that the argument that supports the contingency objection, however, is invalid. Herein, I supply two valid versions of the argument; thus, the classical theist is required to defuse the argument.\",\"PeriodicalId\":14947,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Analytic Theology\",\"volume\":\"51 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Analytic Theology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.12978/jat.2021-9.120009021417\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Analytic Theology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.12978/jat.2021-9.120009021417","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Repairing the Contingency Argument against Divine Simplicity
According to classical theism, God is simple. However, contemporary objections to divine simplicity abound. One of those objections has received a lot of attention recently: the contingency objection. The objection is taken to pose a threat to God's freedom. Tomaszewski argues that the argument that supports the contingency objection, however, is invalid. Herein, I supply two valid versions of the argument; thus, the classical theist is required to defuse the argument.