{"title":"保险中可争议性的福利效应","authors":"Rob van der Noll, F. Paolucci","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.907279","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply side. We investigate the contestability clause in the policy: when a claim is filed, the insurer may dispute it on grounds of the information provided by the insuree. Smoking in life insurance is our leading example: there are different rates for smokers and non-smokers. We compare the aggregate utility in a two contracts economy with a one, non-contestable contract economy. Having two contracts alleviates adverse selection, but increases the risk in the smokers pool. The negative effect dominates: contestability decreases welfare.","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Welfare Effects of Contestability in Insurance\",\"authors\":\"Rob van der Noll, F. Paolucci\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.907279\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply side. We investigate the contestability clause in the policy: when a claim is filed, the insurer may dispute it on grounds of the information provided by the insuree. Smoking in life insurance is our leading example: there are different rates for smokers and non-smokers. We compare the aggregate utility in a two contracts economy with a one, non-contestable contract economy. Having two contracts alleviates adverse selection, but increases the risk in the smokers pool. The negative effect dominates: contestability decreases welfare.\",\"PeriodicalId\":29865,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"67 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.907279\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.907279","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Welfare Effects of Contestability in Insurance
We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply side. We investigate the contestability clause in the policy: when a claim is filed, the insurer may dispute it on grounds of the information provided by the insuree. Smoking in life insurance is our leading example: there are different rates for smokers and non-smokers. We compare the aggregate utility in a two contracts economy with a one, non-contestable contract economy. Having two contracts alleviates adverse selection, but increases the risk in the smokers pool. The negative effect dominates: contestability decreases welfare.
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