债务重组和信托契约法

IF 0.6 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Harald Halbhuber
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引用次数: 1

摘要

这篇文章表明,《信托契约法》,一个大萧条时期的管理债券契约的法规,不可能被用来禁止像马尔布雷盖特那样的债务重组。在该判决中,一家联邦法院最近裁定,债务重组违反了法规的不减值条款,因为它让无担保债券持有人面临一个选择:要么将债券换成股本,要么因有担保债权人丧失抵押品赎回权而对空壳提出索赔。这篇文章表明,在20世纪30年代,像Marblegate这样的交易并不像法院所说的那样是一种不可预见的法律手段,而是一种普遍接受的债务重组技术。没有迹象表明国会打算取缔它们。更重要的是,当时大多数债券契约已经包含了法院所依赖的不减值条款,远早于法规的强制规定。该条款与Marblegate事件中的重组同时存在,任何人都没有想到,更不用说国会了,该条款会禁止此类交易。不过,正如这篇文章所显示的那样,该条款并非无关紧要的样板,使其成为强制性条款对SEC的政策至关重要。这并不意味着少数债权人在破产之外的债务重组中没有任何保护。这些重组受制于欺诈性转让和其他一般保护债权人的法律,就像上世纪30年代那样。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Debt Restructurings and the Trust Indenture Act
This article demonstrates that the Trust Indenture Act, a Depression-era statute governing bond indentures, cannot have been intended to prohibit debt restructurings like the one in Marblegate. In that decision, a federal court recently held that a debt restructuring violated the non-impairment provision of the statute because it presented unsecured bondholders with a choice between exchanging their bonds for equity and being left with claims against an empty shell by virtue of a foreclosure by secured creditors. This article shows that, in the 1930s, transactions like the one in Marblegate were not, as the court suggested, an unforeseen legal device, but a generally accepted debt restructuring technique. There is no indication that Congress intended to outlaw them. More importantly, most bond indentures at the time already contained the non-impairment provision relied on by the court, well before it was mandated by the statute. That provision co-existed with restructurings like the one in Marblegate, and it did not occur to anyone, let alone Congress, that the provision would have prohibited such transactions. Still, as the article also shows, the provision was not irrelevant boilerplate, and making it mandatory was critical to the SEC’s policy. This does not mean that minority bondholders have no protections in debt restructurings outside bankruptcy. These restructurings are subject to fraudulent conveyance and other laws protecting creditors generally, just as they would have been in the 1930s.
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CiteScore
1.10
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