美联储政策与房地产泡沫

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Lawrence H. White
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But to explain industry-wide errors we need to identify price and incentive distortions capable of having industry-wide effects. Here I will make two main points. First, the Federal Reserve's expansionary monetary policy supplied the means for unsustainable housing prices and unsustainable mortgage financing. Elsewhere (White 2008) I have discussed the growth in regulatory mandates and subsidies that exaggerated the demand for riskier mortgages, most importantly the implicit guarantees to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that combined with HUD's imposition of \"affordable housing\" mandates on Fannie and Freddie to accelerate the creation of a market for securitized subprime mortgages. (1) Second, the Federal Reserve has undertaken self-initiated new lending roles that constitute a shadow bailout program more than twice the size of the Treasury's $700 billion bailout program. There is unfortunately little evidence that the Fed's new lending has helped to resolve our financial problems, rather than to delay their resolution. The Credit Supply Bubble Some authors, considering the relationship of Federal Reserve policy to asset bubbles, ask only: Should the Fed actively burst a growing bubble? If so, how? As posed, their questions suggest that asset bubbles arise independent of monetary policy, and the only Fed role to be discussed is that of bubble-buster. A more important pair of questions is: Does Fed policy as currently conducted tend to inflate assets bubbles? If so, how can we reformulate policy to avoid that tendency? Call our objective a non-bubble-prone or \"non-effervescent\" monetary policy. The economics profession has not reached a consensus on what the optimally non-effervescent monetary policy is, but it is now widely agreed that it isn't holding interest rates too low for too long. It should also now be clear that a Fed policy that deliberately ignores asset prices, as though consumer prices alone were a sufficient indicator of excessive Fed expansion, is also not the way to avoid inflating asset bubbles. In the recession of 2001, the Federal Reserve System under Chairman Alan Greenspan began aggressively expanding the U.S. money supply. Year-over-year growth in the M2 monetary aggregate rose briefly above 10 percent, and remained above 8 percent entering the second half of 2003. The expansion was accompanied by the Fed's repeatedly lowering its target for the federal funds (interbank overnight) interest rate. The Fed funds rate began 2001 at 6.25 percent and ended the year at 1.75 percent. The Greenspan Fed reduced the rate further in 2002 and 2003, pushing it in mid-2003 a record low of 1 percent, where it stayed for a year. 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引用次数: 66

摘要

美国房地产泡沫及其破裂的后果并不是自由放任的货币和金融体系的结果。它们发生在一个没有锚定的政府法定货币体系和一个受限制的金融体系中。发生了什么,为什么?我们当前的金融动荡始于美联储不寻常的货币政策举措和新的联邦监管干预。这些选择不当的公共政策扭曲了利率和资产价格,将可贷款资金转移到错误的投资领域,并将通常稳健的金融机构扭曲到不可持续的境地。毫无疑问,私人部门的误判和轻率行为使不少机构的情况变得更糟。这样的错误有助于解释哪些特定的公司陷入了最大的麻烦。但要解释全行业的错误,我们需要确定能够产生全行业影响的价格和激励扭曲。在这里,我主要讲两点。首先,美联储的扩张性货币政策为不可持续的房价和不可持续的抵押贷款融资提供了手段。在其他地方(White 2008),我讨论了监管命令和补贴的增长,这些命令和补贴夸大了对风险更高的抵押贷款的需求,最重要的是对房利美和房地美的隐性担保,加上住房和城市发展部对房利美和房地美的“经济适用房”强制要求,加速了证券化次级抵押贷款市场的创建。(1)其次,美联储主动承担了新的贷款角色,构成了一个影子救助计划,其规模是财政部7,000亿美元救助计划的两倍多。不幸的是,几乎没有证据表明美联储的新贷款帮助解决了我们的金融问题,而不是推迟了这些问题的解决。一些作者在考虑美联储政策与资产泡沫的关系时,只会问:美联储是否应该积极地戳破日益膨胀的泡沫?如果有,怎么做?他们提出的问题表明,资产泡沫的产生与货币政策无关,而美联储唯一要讨论的角色是泡沫破坏者。更重要的一对问题是:美联储目前的政策是否倾向于吹大资产泡沫?如果是这样,我们如何重新制定政策以避免这种趋势?把我们的目标称为不容易产生泡沫或“不起泡”的货币政策。经济学界尚未就什么是最理想的不泡沫化货币政策达成共识,但现在人们普遍认为,在太长时间内保持过低的利率是不合适的。现在还应该清楚的是,美联储故意忽视资产价格的政策——仿佛消费者价格本身就是美联储过度扩张的一个充分指标——也不是避免资产泡沫膨胀的办法。在2001年的经济衰退中,格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)主席领导下的美联储(Federal Reserve System)开始积极扩大美国的货币供应。M2货币总量的年增长率一度超过10%,进入2003年下半年后一直保持在8%以上。伴随着经济扩张,美联储不断降低联邦基金(银行间隔夜)利率目标。联邦基金利率2001年初为6.25%,年底为1.75%。格林斯潘领导下的美联储在2002年和2003年进一步降低了利率,并在2003年中期将利率降至1%的历史低点,并维持了一年。实际联邦基金利率在前所未有的两年半时间里为负——这意味着名义利率低于当代通胀率。在那个时期,借款人只要购买并持有空地,其价格(扣除税收后)仅能跟上通货膨胀,就能按所借金额的比例获利。我们如何判断美联储的扩张是否超出了应有水平?为了使法定央行的政策对金融市场尽可能保持中性,一个古老的(尽管不再流行)准则是,以名义支出规模的稳定(零增长)为目标。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Federal Reserve Policy and the Housing Bubble
The U.S. housing bubble and the fallout from its bursting are not the results of a laissez-faire monetary and financial system. They happened in an unanchored government fiat monetary system with a restricted financial system. What Happened and Why? Our current financial turmoil began with unusual monetary policy moves by the Federal Reserve System and novel federal regulatory interventions. These poorly chosen public policies distorted interest rates and asset prices, diverted loanable funds into the wrong investments, and twisted normally robust financial institutions into unsustainable positions. There is no doubt that private miscalculation and imprudence have made matters worse for more than a few institutions. Such mistakes help to explain which particular firms have run into the most trouble. But to explain industry-wide errors we need to identify price and incentive distortions capable of having industry-wide effects. Here I will make two main points. First, the Federal Reserve's expansionary monetary policy supplied the means for unsustainable housing prices and unsustainable mortgage financing. Elsewhere (White 2008) I have discussed the growth in regulatory mandates and subsidies that exaggerated the demand for riskier mortgages, most importantly the implicit guarantees to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that combined with HUD's imposition of "affordable housing" mandates on Fannie and Freddie to accelerate the creation of a market for securitized subprime mortgages. (1) Second, the Federal Reserve has undertaken self-initiated new lending roles that constitute a shadow bailout program more than twice the size of the Treasury's $700 billion bailout program. There is unfortunately little evidence that the Fed's new lending has helped to resolve our financial problems, rather than to delay their resolution. The Credit Supply Bubble Some authors, considering the relationship of Federal Reserve policy to asset bubbles, ask only: Should the Fed actively burst a growing bubble? If so, how? As posed, their questions suggest that asset bubbles arise independent of monetary policy, and the only Fed role to be discussed is that of bubble-buster. A more important pair of questions is: Does Fed policy as currently conducted tend to inflate assets bubbles? If so, how can we reformulate policy to avoid that tendency? Call our objective a non-bubble-prone or "non-effervescent" monetary policy. The economics profession has not reached a consensus on what the optimally non-effervescent monetary policy is, but it is now widely agreed that it isn't holding interest rates too low for too long. It should also now be clear that a Fed policy that deliberately ignores asset prices, as though consumer prices alone were a sufficient indicator of excessive Fed expansion, is also not the way to avoid inflating asset bubbles. In the recession of 2001, the Federal Reserve System under Chairman Alan Greenspan began aggressively expanding the U.S. money supply. Year-over-year growth in the M2 monetary aggregate rose briefly above 10 percent, and remained above 8 percent entering the second half of 2003. The expansion was accompanied by the Fed's repeatedly lowering its target for the federal funds (interbank overnight) interest rate. The Fed funds rate began 2001 at 6.25 percent and ended the year at 1.75 percent. The Greenspan Fed reduced the rate further in 2002 and 2003, pushing it in mid-2003 a record low of 1 percent, where it stayed for a year. The real Fed funds rate was negative--meaning that nominal rates were lower than the contemporary rate of inflation--for an unprecedented two and a half years. A borrower during that period who simply purchased and held vacant land, the price of which (net of taxes) merely kept up with inflation, was profiting in proportion to what he borrowed. How do we judge whether the Fed expanded more than it should have? One venerable (albeit no longer popular) norm for making fiat central bank policy as neutral as possible toward the financial market is to aim for stability (zero growth) in the volume of nominal expenditure. …
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Cato Journal
Cato Journal Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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