政治在新兴市场金融危机中的作用

Paola L. Montero Ledezma
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我们将发展中国家特有的关键政治机制嵌入到金融危机的政治经济模型中。在这种情况下,金融市场失灵允许政府适时干预,以恢复资源的最佳配置。然而,糟糕的公共政策可能引发金融危机。研究发现,在生产率方面,政治利益和个体的一维异质性导致中等生产力经济主体和中等生产力经济主体之间的政策偏好不同,从而可能导致不良的公共干预。因此,这两个参考个体之间的差异越大,金融危机发生的概率就越高。我们还讨论了阿根廷(2001-2002年)金融危机的一些特征及其与我们模型的相似之处。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS
In this paper, we embed the key political mechanisms, specific to developing countries, into a political-economic model of financial crises. In this setup, financial market failures allow opportune government intervention to restore optimal allocation of resources. However, bad public policies could provoke financial crises. We find that the political interests and individuals’ 1-dimensional heterogeneity, in terms of productivity, lead to different preferred policies between the median-productive and mean-productive economic agents, which might in turn induce to bad public intervention. Therefore, the larger the difference between these two reference individuals, the higher the probability of financial crises. We also discuss some features of the financial crises in Argentina (2001-2002) and its similarities with our model.
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