PHP应用程序的内省入侵检测

Byron Hawkins, Brian Demsky
{"title":"PHP应用程序的内省入侵检测","authors":"Byron Hawkins, Brian Demsky","doi":"10.1109/ICSE.2017.29","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Since its first appearance more than 20 years ago, PHP has steadily increased in popularity, and has become the foundation of the Internet's most popular content management systems (CMS). Of the world's 1 million most visited websites, nearly half use a CMS, and WordPress alone claims 25% market share of all websites. While their easy-to-use templates and components have greatly simplified the work of developing high quality websites, it comes at the cost of software vulnerabilities that are inevitable in such large and rapidly evolving frameworks. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are often used to protect Internet-facing applications, but conventional techniques struggle to keep up with the fast pace of development in today's web applications. Rapid changes to application interfaces increase the workload of maintaining an IDS whitelist, yet the broad attack surface of a web application makes for a similarly verbose blacklist. We developed ZenIDS to dynamically learn the trusted execution paths of an application during a short online training period and report execution anomalies as potential intrusions. We implement ZenIDS as a PHP extension supported by 8 hooks instrumented in the PHP interpreter. Our experiments demonstrate its effectiveness monitoring live web traffic for one year to 3 large PHP applications, detecting malicious requests with a false positive rate of less than .01% after training on fewer than 4,000 requests. ZenIDS excludes the vast majority of deployed PHP code from the whitelist because it is never used for valid requests–yet could potentially be exploited by a remote adversary. We observe 5% performance overhead (or less) for our applications vs. an optimized vanilla LAMP stack.","PeriodicalId":6505,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE/ACM 39th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE)","volume":"140 1","pages":"232-243"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ZenIDS: Introspective Intrusion Detection for PHP Applications\",\"authors\":\"Byron Hawkins, Brian Demsky\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICSE.2017.29\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Since its first appearance more than 20 years ago, PHP has steadily increased in popularity, and has become the foundation of the Internet's most popular content management systems (CMS). Of the world's 1 million most visited websites, nearly half use a CMS, and WordPress alone claims 25% market share of all websites. While their easy-to-use templates and components have greatly simplified the work of developing high quality websites, it comes at the cost of software vulnerabilities that are inevitable in such large and rapidly evolving frameworks. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are often used to protect Internet-facing applications, but conventional techniques struggle to keep up with the fast pace of development in today's web applications. Rapid changes to application interfaces increase the workload of maintaining an IDS whitelist, yet the broad attack surface of a web application makes for a similarly verbose blacklist. We developed ZenIDS to dynamically learn the trusted execution paths of an application during a short online training period and report execution anomalies as potential intrusions. We implement ZenIDS as a PHP extension supported by 8 hooks instrumented in the PHP interpreter. Our experiments demonstrate its effectiveness monitoring live web traffic for one year to 3 large PHP applications, detecting malicious requests with a false positive rate of less than .01% after training on fewer than 4,000 requests. ZenIDS excludes the vast majority of deployed PHP code from the whitelist because it is never used for valid requests–yet could potentially be exploited by a remote adversary. We observe 5% performance overhead (or less) for our applications vs. an optimized vanilla LAMP stack.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6505,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2017 IEEE/ACM 39th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE)\",\"volume\":\"140 1\",\"pages\":\"232-243\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-05-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"11\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2017 IEEE/ACM 39th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSE.2017.29\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2017 IEEE/ACM 39th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSE.2017.29","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11

摘要

自20多年前首次出现以来,PHP的受欢迎程度稳步上升,并已成为Internet上最流行的内容管理系统(CMS)的基础。在全球访问量最大的100万个网站中,近一半使用CMS,仅WordPress就占据了所有网站25%的市场份额。虽然它们易于使用的模板和组件极大地简化了开发高质量网站的工作,但它的代价是软件漏洞,这在如此庞大和快速发展的框架中是不可避免的。入侵检测系统(IDS)通常用于保护面向internet的应用程序,但传统技术难以跟上当今web应用程序的快速发展步伐。应用程序接口的快速更改增加了维护IDS白名单的工作量,而web应用程序的广泛攻击面也会产生类似的冗长黑名单。我们开发ZenIDS是为了在短暂的在线培训期间动态学习应用程序的可信执行路径,并将执行异常报告为潜在的入侵。我们将ZenIDS实现为PHP扩展,该扩展由PHP解释器中的8个钩子支持。我们的实验证明了它对3个大型PHP应用程序进行为期一年的实时网络流量监控的有效性,在对不到4,000个请求进行训练后,检测恶意请求的误报率低于0.01%。ZenIDS将绝大多数已部署的PHP代码从白名单中排除,因为它从未用于有效请求,但可能被远程攻击者利用。我们观察到,与优化的LAMP堆栈相比,我们的应用程序的性能开销为5%(或更少)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
ZenIDS: Introspective Intrusion Detection for PHP Applications
Since its first appearance more than 20 years ago, PHP has steadily increased in popularity, and has become the foundation of the Internet's most popular content management systems (CMS). Of the world's 1 million most visited websites, nearly half use a CMS, and WordPress alone claims 25% market share of all websites. While their easy-to-use templates and components have greatly simplified the work of developing high quality websites, it comes at the cost of software vulnerabilities that are inevitable in such large and rapidly evolving frameworks. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are often used to protect Internet-facing applications, but conventional techniques struggle to keep up with the fast pace of development in today's web applications. Rapid changes to application interfaces increase the workload of maintaining an IDS whitelist, yet the broad attack surface of a web application makes for a similarly verbose blacklist. We developed ZenIDS to dynamically learn the trusted execution paths of an application during a short online training period and report execution anomalies as potential intrusions. We implement ZenIDS as a PHP extension supported by 8 hooks instrumented in the PHP interpreter. Our experiments demonstrate its effectiveness monitoring live web traffic for one year to 3 large PHP applications, detecting malicious requests with a false positive rate of less than .01% after training on fewer than 4,000 requests. ZenIDS excludes the vast majority of deployed PHP code from the whitelist because it is never used for valid requests–yet could potentially be exploited by a remote adversary. We observe 5% performance overhead (or less) for our applications vs. an optimized vanilla LAMP stack.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信