The Decartes’ paradox and the modern philosophy as the foundation farse

In this article the author identifies a paradox at the heart of Descartes? foundationalist project. The components of the paradox are as follows: on the one hand, ontological certainty of cogito, on the other hand, its epistemic uncertainty: it is impossible for the solus ipse to establish the elementary truth: at present it is impossible to determine whether it is now night or daylight. For Descartes the solution consists of introducing God and in believing in His existence. But this is no solution whatsoever, for a subject would require direct contact with God in order to receive clear and distinct ideas, which are at the same time marks of their truth. The author concludes the following: firstly, Descartes managed to establish a foundation for nothing; secondly, the Cartesian project that includes the necessity of contact with God as a way to attain the Truth, becomes completed only in Hegel?s philosophy of Absolut Knowledge (in Wiss. der Logik), along with his justification provided in the Phenoimenologie des Gesites. The post-Hegelian philosophy, however, has engendered its own paradox by abandoning Hegel?s own solution despite it being fully Cartesian in its character. This was the consequence of abandoning God and declaring Hegel?s philosophy as a deplorable conservative revival of theology; something that was beyond understanding by modern philosophers. The abandonment of God had as its consequence the return to the Cartesian paradox, which reopened the question of truth - connected to the Cogito, and the question of sense (Sinn) - connected to the sum of human subject. The neglect of God leads to the departure from ratio-centrism in two ways: the epistemic perspectivism and relativism, on the one hand, and Nihilism, voluntarism with decisionism, along with existentialism, on the other. Consequently, with the death of God, and the fall of Hegel?s system, the modern metaphysics of subjectivity reveals itself as founded merely on the Will to power - as a will for God, until Hegel, and a will against God, subsequently. Thus, Heidegger was right when he said that Nietzsche?s Will to Power was the end of the Western metaphysics. The author complements this finding by adding that this kind of metaphysic had already been concealed within the Descartes Meditations from the start, in the forms of the will for the Reason and the will for God. Finally, the author concludes that the modern philosophy completes its own Odyssey of looking for a foundation by abandoning the Hegelian solution, blind to the fact that Hegel?s solution was the only consequent Cartesian one. The ultimate result was the fall of ratio-centrism into nihilism, voluntarism, and existentialism, as promoted under a thin vail of Picodellamirandolian humanism.