低压故障攻击AES

2010 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) Pub Date : 2010-06-13 DOI:10.1109/HST.2010.5513121

Alessandro Barenghi, G. Bertoni, L. Breveglieri, M. Pellicioli, Gerardo Pelosi

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引用次数: 68

摘要

提出了一种针对任意密钥长度的高级加密标准(AES)的基于故障的攻击方法，并通过低压感应故障对其进行了实际验证。运行受攻击算法的CPU是ARM926EJ-S:一种32位处理器，广泛部署在计算机外围设备、电信设备和低功耗便携式设备中。针对商用开发板上arm926ejj - s的两种实现，我们通过在成熟的Linux 2.6操作系统上运行AES算法的计算中诱导错误来证明这种攻击的实际可行性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Low voltage fault attacks to AES

This paper presents a new fault based attack on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with any key length, together with its practical validation through the use of low voltage induced faults. The CPU running the attacked algorithm is the ARM926EJ-S: a 32-bit processor widely deployed in computer peripherals, telecommunication appliances and low power portable devices. We prove the practical feasibility of this attack through inducing faults in the computation of the AES algorithm running on a full fledged Linux 2.6 operating system targeted to two implementations of the ARM926EJ-S on commercial development boards.

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来源期刊

2010 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)

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