累积投票制下的少数民族投票率和代表权。一个实验

A. Casella, Jeffrey J. Guo, Michelle Jiang
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在多数选举制度下,确保少数群体的参与和代表权仍然是一个悬而未决的问题,这在美国因其压制选民的历史而显得尤为突出。法院推荐的一种补救办法是累积投票(CV):每个选民拥有与空缺职位相同数量的选票,并且可以根据需要向尽可能少的候选人累积选票。理论预测,CV鼓励少数人克服投票障碍:尽管每个选民都受到平等对待,CV增加了少数人相对于多数人的投票率,以及少数人赢得的席位份额。一个基于昂贵投票设计的实验室实验强烈支持这两种预测。国家经济研究局工作论文系列的机构订阅者和发展中国家的居民可以在www.nber.org免费下载本文。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Minority Turnout and Representation Under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment
Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority's turnout relative to the majority, and the minority's share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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