注意专利

John Thomas
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引用次数: 0

摘要

专利采用美国专利商标局(USPTO)积极传播的公开信形式。这些文件是否充分地向公众提供了它们所描述的技术的通知,以及它们所主张的专有权利,一直是长期争论的主题。许多评论家得出结论,专利往往在研究和开发周期中过早提交,故意以模糊或迟钝的方式起草,或者只是数量太多。因此,确定相关的专利格局不仅对技术实施者来说是困难的,而且作为创新政策的一个问题可能也是不可取的。然而,先前的学术很少承认当前的法定机制,以改善专利发布后的通知功能。本文试图填补这一空白。长期以来,国会一直鼓励知识产权持有人在他们销售的产品上标明他们的专利。专利标记传统上发生在物理产品或其包装上,尽管最近已扩展到基于互联网的虚拟标记。《商标法》规定,专利所有人在对侵权人提出质疑时,未进行商标标记的将面临严厉的补救限制。国会也指派食品和药物管理局(FDA)负责提供专利通知。为了与联邦法律保持一致,该机构维持着两种出版物,通常被称为“橙色书”和“紫色书”,它们是已批准药物和已许可生物制剂的专利信息交换所。专利在市场中的作用可能提供了该工具可能提供的最有价值的通知形式。然而,标志法规和FDA出版物存在一些明显的缺陷。总的来说,他们预测无法识别与产品相关的所有专利,支持专利流氓,涉及可疑的实际工作,促进误导性广告,并且与同行知识产权的通知要求相比,实施惩罚性制裁。就其本身而言,在过去的四十年里,FDA已经被证明是一个缺乏经验和不可靠的专利公关。本文提出了完善专利发布后通知功能的具体建议。它要求美国专利商标局开发和填充自己的虚拟标记数据库,将个人专利与市场联系起来。它还鼓励FDA采取进一步措施,反对滥用“橙色书”和“紫色书”,并加快其专利通知功能。最后,本文从这一努力中吸取了更广泛的经验教训,为政策制定者在努力改善专利制度的通知功能时提供了超越专利工具的途径。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Noticing Patents
Patents take the form of public letters that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) actively disseminates. Whether these documents sufficiently provide the public with notice of the technologies they describe, as well as the proprietary rights that they assert, has been subject to long-standing debate. Many commentators conclude that patents are often filed too early in the research and development cycle, are deliberately drafted in a vague or obtuse manner, or are simply too numerous. As a result, identifying the relevant patent landscape is not just difficult for technology implementers, but possibly undesirable as a matter of innovation policy. Yet prior scholarship has seldom acknowledged current statutory mechanisms to improve the notice function of patents after they issue. This Article endeavors to fill that gap. Congress has long encouraged intellectual property rights holders to identify their patents on the products they sell. Patent marking has traditionally occurred on physical products or their packaging, although it has been recently extended to Internet-based virtual marking. The marking statute stipulates that patent proprietors that fail to mark face severe remedial restrictions when challenging infringers. Congress has assigned the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) a part in providing patent notice as well. In keeping with federal legislation, the agency maintains two publications, commonly known as the Orange and Purple Books, that act as a patent clearinghouse for approved drugs and licensed biologics. The role of a patent within the marketplace provides perhaps the most valuable form of notice that that instrument may offer. Yet the marking statute and FDA publications suffer from some apparent flaws. In combination they project a failure to identify all patents that are relevant to the product, favor patent trolls, involve dubious practical workings, promote misleading advertising, and impose punitive sanctions in comparison to the notice requirements of peer intellectual property rights. For its part, the FDA has proven an untutored and unreliable patent publicist for the past four decades. This Article offers specific suggestions to improve the notice functions of patents after they issue. It calls for the USPTO to develop and populate its own virtual marking database that correlates individual patents with the marketplace. It also encourages the FDA to take further steps to counter abuses of the Orange and Purple Books and to accelerate their patent notice functions. Finally, this Article takes broader lessons from this effort, offering pathways for policymakers to look beyond the patent instrument as they endeavor to improve the patent system’s notice functions.
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